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BEYOND CARDBOARD CLIENTS IN LEGAL ETHICS 
 
Katherine R. Kruse∗
 
In the world of legal ethics, clients are most often constructed 
as cardboard figures interested solely in maximizing their own wealth 
or freedom at the expense of others. 1   Scour any professional 
responsibility textbook, and you will find examples of the ethical 
issues that arise when the pursuit of a client’s interests requires a 
lawyer to harm innocent third parties, undermine the truth-seeking 
norms of the legal system, or both.  The proliferation of these 
examples is no accident.  Rather, it is a consequence of a choice by 
early legal ethicists to focus on the dilemma faced by a lawyer forced 
by professional duty to do something that would otherwise be wrong.  
To generate this kind of dilemma, legal ethicists had to posit 
hypothetical clients impervious to ordinary moral considerations, 
unconcerned with preserving their relationships with others and 
indifferent to their reputations in the community. 
 
This Article argues that the reliance on cardboard clients has 
disserved legal ethics by obscuring important issues of professional 
responsibility that cannot be examined in the simplified world of the 
standard professional responsibility hypothetical.  Most notably, the 
reliance on cardboard clients has disabled legal ethicists from 
confronting a problem I call legal objectification.  Legal objectification 
is the tendency of lawyers to view their clients as walking bundles of 
legal rights and interests rather than as whole persons whose legal 
issues often come deeply intertwined with other concerns—
relationships, loyalties, hopes, uncertainties, fears, doubts, and 
values—that shape the objectives they bring to legal representation. 
 
The classic example of Spaulding v. Zimmerman is a case in 
point.2  In Spaulding, a personal injury defense lawyer learned from 
his own medical expert that the plaintiff had suffered a heart aneurysm 
probably caused by the automobile accident at issue in the case.3  The 
                                                 
∗ Associate Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada Las 
Vegas.  I would like to thank the following persons for facilitating invaluable 
discussion of these ideas and feedback on earlier drafts this article: Susan Carle, 
David Luban, Rob Rubinson, and Ted Schneyer.  This article benefited greatly from 
presentation at the Law Speakers’ Series at American University, Washington 
College of Law, the Clinical Research Forum at William S. Boyd School of Law, 
and the Potomac Valley Writer’s Workshop. 
1 See Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 1731, 1737 (1993); Robert Rubinson, Attorney Fact-Finding, Ethical Decision-
Making and the Methodology of Law, 45 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1185 (2001). 
2 Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (1962). 
3 Id. at 707.   
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defense lawyer proceeded to settle the case without ever revealing to 
the plaintiff that his life was in danger.  The court re-opened the 
settlement two years later when the aneurysm was discovered in a 
routine medical examination.4   However, the court was careful to note 
that “no canon of ethics or legal obligation” had required the defense 
lawyer to inform the plaintiff of the life-threatening medical 
condition.5
 
For almost thirty years, legal ethicists have used the dramatic 
facts of Spaulding to discuss the boundaries of a lawyer’s competing 
moral and professional duties when divulging confidential information 
could save a human life.6   However, to use Spaulding to explore this 
moral and ethical dilemma, one must imagine a client who will not 
consent to disclose the confidential information.  Lawyers are always 
ethically permitted to reveal confidential information if the client 
consents after consultation.7  If the client in Spaulding were to consent 
to reveal the information—perhaps because the client shares the 
lawyer’s concern for the value of human life—the lawyer’s dilemma 
would disappear. 
 
When the facts behind Spaulding are probed more deeply, it 
appears quite likely that the client would have consented to reveal the 
potentially life-saving information—that is, if his lawyer had consulted 
him.8  The litigation in Spaulding arose from a car accident in the mid-
1950s involving three families living in the same rural area of 
Minnesota.9   The action was brought on behalf of 20-year-old David 
Spaulding, a passenger in the car driven by 19-year-old John 
Zimmerman.10  When the accident occurred, Zimmerman had been 
 
4 Id. at 709. 
5 Id. at 710. 
6  See Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles, Professional Secrecy and Its 
Exceptions: Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN. L. REV. 63, 65-66, 72 
(1998).   For many years, the public policy exception to permit disclosure to prevent 
harm to others was conditioned on “prevent[ing] the client from committing a 
criminal act that was reasonably certain to cause imminent death or substantial 
bodily harm.” MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6(b)(1) (1983) (emphasis added).   The 
most recent amendments to the ABA Model Rules omit the requirement that one’s 
client be criminally culpable and permit disclosure “to prevent reasonably certain 
death or substantial bodily harm” regardless of whether the threat to life or bodily 
security arises from a criminal act.  MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6(b)(1) (2002). 
7  MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6(a) (2002) (“A lawyer shall not reveal information 
relating to the representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, 
except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).”) (emphasis added). 
8 Cramton & Knowles, supra note 6, at 94. 
9 Id. at 63-64. 
10 Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d, at 706-07. 
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transporting Spaulding and other employees of his father’s road 
construction business home from a worksite at dusk.  Their car 
collided with a car occupied by the Ledermann family on their way to 
the county fair. 11   The accident was a tragic event for all three 
families.  In addition to seriously injuring David Spaulding, the 
accident killed 12-year-old Elaine Ledermann, who was thrown from 
her car; killed John Zimmerman’s brother James, also a passenger in 
his car; and broke the neck of John Zimmerman’s father, Edward.12  
Given the close relationship between John Zimmerman and David 
Spaulding and the devastating loss his own family had already 
suffered, it is likely that Zimmerman would have consented—even 
wanted—to reveal medical information critically important to 
Spaulding’s health and life.13
 
The more interesting moral and ethical question revealed by 
the facts in Spaulding is why a lawyer would make the decision not to 
reveal the confidential information without consulting his client.  One 
likely answer is that the lawyer in Spaulding saw it as his job simply to 
maximize his client’s legal and financial interests and did not consider 
the effect of the settlement on the client’s other values or 
relationships.14  In other words, the lawyer in Spaulding may have 
been guilty of legally objectifying his client—of viewing John 
Zimmerman narrowly as nothing more than a collection of legal and 
financial interests disconnected from the rest of his life. 
 
Legal ethicists have not generally explored the problem of 
legal objectification revealed in Spaulding, nor could they.  To create 
the dilemma legal ethicists wanted to discuss, John Zimmerman had to 
be constructed as a cardboard figure interested only in maximizing his 
legal interests and therefore unwilling to reveal confidential 
information that might increase the damages for which he was liable.  
Once Zimmerman is constructed as a cardboard figure, it is no longer 
possible to see—much less to confront—the problem of legal 
objectification also raised by the case.  And, this kind of oversight will 
always occur when legal ethicists rely on cardboard clients, because 
cardboard clients are constructed in theory from the very same 
narrowing assumptions that plague the problem of legal objectification 
in practice. 
 
11 Cramton & Knowles, supra note 6, at 63. 
12 Id. at 64. 
13 See Cramton & Knowles, supra note 6, at 94.  The authors based this conclusion in 
part on interviews with surviving members of the Zimmerman and Ledermann 
families.  Id. at 91-92. 
14 Id. at 94-96. 
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The construction of cardboard clients in legal ethics has other 
theoretical costs.  Relying on the image of cardboard clients, legal 
ethicists have exaggerated the problem of over-zealous partisanship 
and proposed solutions that distort the balance between lawyers’ 
professional obligations to clients and to the public.  The alternative 
professional ideal most commonly proposed by legal ethicists—
sometimes called the “lawyer-statesman model”—exhorts lawyers to 
conform their clients’ projects to the public good even if that means 
manipulating or betraying their clients in the process. 15   Yet, 
reasonable persons often disagree about the content and application of 
moral standards.  Lawyers who judge their clients’ projects based on 
moral standards that the clients do not share can become guilty of 
moral overreaching.  And, the image of the moral lawyer responsible 
for enforcing the public good enables a systemic denial of the reality—
glaringly obvious to non-lawyer observers—that lawyers often pursue 
their own self-interest at the expense of their clients.16
 
This Article seeks to move legal ethics beyond cardboard 
clients by re-imagining how the ideals of professionalism could have 
developed if legal ethicists had diagnosed the problem of legal 
objectification and sought to cure it.  Part I examines the theoretical 
history of legal ethics at the time of its post-Watergate fluorescence, 
showing how the assumptions of moral lawyers and cardboard clients 
arose from the way legal ethicists initially framed the interesting issues 
in legal ethics as conflicts between ordinary morality and role 
morality.  Part II re-examines the theoretical history of legal ethics to 
reveal an early interest in the problem of legal objectification that was 
never fully explored, and shows how contemporaneous movements in 
legal interviewing and counseling literature implicitly addressed the 
problem of legal objectification.  Part III proposes a model of 
partisanship for three-dimensional clients that brings these divergent 
strands together and places fidelity to client values at the center of a 
lawyer’s partisan duties.  Part IV examines the limitations of the client 
valued-based model of representation proposed in Part III in the 
contexts of representing diminished capacity clients, representing 
organizational clients, and pursuing cause lawyering where 
mobilization around collective values is necessary to fight systemic 
injustice. 
 
 
 
 
15 See infra Part II.C. 
16 See infra Part III.E. 
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I. MORAL LAWYERS AND CARDBOARD CLIENTS IN LEGAL ETHICS 
 
Theoretical interest in legal ethics began in the mid-1970s, and 
it was a propitious time for theoretical development in the field.  
Monroe Freedman was in the midst of a searing campaign to unseat 
the orthodoxy and hypocrisy of professional self-regulation.17  The 
American Bar Association (ABA) had adopted a law school 
accreditation standard that required instruction in professional 
responsibility. 18   And, the legal profession was itself undergoing 
intense self-scrutiny.  The ABA was beginning an open, public, and at 
times hotly-contested process of re-writing the standards that govern 
professional regulation into the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct.19  The Kutak Commission, which took on the task of drafting 
the Model Rules, was conscious of the need to rehabilitate the public 
image of lawyers and deliberately solicitous of academic critique as a 
source of guidance in the early stages of its rule-making process.20
 
The initial foray by moral philosophers into legal ethics came 
with philosopher Richard Wasserstrom’s 1975 essay Lawyers as 
Professionals: Some Moral Issues.21  In the decade or so that followed, 
a host of moral philosophers and legal scholars would weigh in on the 
theoretical questions of how to justify lawyers’ professional 
behavior.22  Looking back on the earliest moral philosophical essays in 
 
17  Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense 
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1469, n.1 (1966); 
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM vii-viii 
(1975).  See also William H. Simon, “Thinking Like a Lawyer” About Legal Ethics, 
27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 1 (1998) (describing the impact of Freedman’s work). 
18 David Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: A Philosophical Research Program for 
Legal Ethics, 40 MD. L. REV. 451, 452-53 (1981); David Luban, Reason and Passion 
in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV. 873, 878-79 (1999). 
19 In 1969, the American Bar Association replaced the 1908 Canons of Professional 
Ethics with the Code of Professional Responsibility.  In 1977, the ABA appointed a 
Commission on the Evaluation of Professional Standards chaired by Robert Kutak to 
recommend revisions to the Code of Professional Responsibility.  Between 1977 and 
1983, the Kutak Commission engaged the profession and the public in an 
unprecedented process of ethical reform, circulating four drafts of its own re-
formulation of the Code into the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  STEPHEN 
GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 3 
(2001 edition).   
20 See Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 677 (1989). 
21 Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 
1 (1975). 
22  In 1976, philosopher Charles Fried published a philosophical defense of the 
morality of the lawyer-client relationship as a “special-purpose friendship.”  Charles 
Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 
85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).  These two articles set the agenda for further discussion in 
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legal ethics, David Luban commented that they “inaugurated a new 
approach to legal ethics . . . that centers on the issue of role morality 
and its conflict with universal morality.”23  However, as Part II of this 
Article will demonstrate, the conflict between professional role 
morality and universal morality was not the only way that the 
important moral questions in legal practice could have been framed.  
Wasserstrom’s earliest essay raised a concern—arguably at the center 
of his critique of legal professionalism—that lawyers tend to objectify 
their clients in terms of the clients’ legal interests—what I am calling 
the problem of legal objectification. 
 
This part will explore how moral theory developed away from 
Wasserstrom’s diagnosis of legal objectification as a central moral 
problem of legal professionalism and came to rely in theory on the 
same kind of legal objectification that Wasserstrom condemned in 
practice: the cardboard construction of clients defined solely by the 
maximization of their legal interests. 
 
A. Zeal at the Margin as a Role Morality for Lawyers 
 
The most important force in defining and solidifying the study 
of legal ethics as an academic discipline came from the Working 
Group on Legal Ethics.24  This group of leading moral philosophers, 
 
the field of philosophy.  Luban, Reason and Passion, supra note 18, at 878-79.  
Other early articles included Monroe H. Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a 
Professional System, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 191 (1978); Warren Lehman, The Pursuit 
of a Client’s Interests, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078 (1979); David Luban, Paternalism and 
the Legal Profession, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 454; David  Luban, The Lysistratian 
Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. BAR FOUND.  RESEARCH J. 
637; Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, 
and Some Possibilities, 1986 AMER. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J.  613; Gerald J. 
Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U L. REV. 63 (1980); 
Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy’s Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 
WIS. L. REV. 1529; Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of 
Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669 673 (1978); Thomas L. Shaffer, Christian Theories of 
Professional Responsibility, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 721, 722-23 (1975).; Thomas 
Shaffer, The Practice of Law as a Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231 
(1979); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29; 
William H. Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 
STAN. L. REV. 487 (1980); William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 
36 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering,  
101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988).  See also essays collected in THE GOOD LAWYER: 
LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS (David Luban, ed. 1983). 
23 Luban, Reason and Passion, supra note 18, at 878-79. 
24 The Working Group was built on a foundation laid in 1977 when the Council for 
Philosophical Studies held an Institute on Law and Ethics.  Conversation with David 
Luban, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Washington D.C., 
3/23/07). 
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legal scholars and practitioners met during 1981-82 to present and 
discuss a series of papers at the University of Maryland’s Center for 
Philosophy and Public Policy.25  David Luban, then a young research 
associate at the Center, devised an ambitious research agenda for the 
Working Group of “hard, unsolved, and mostly unexplored issues in 
legal ethics that are amenable to treatment by moral philosophy.”26
 
Most of the research agenda for the Working Group centered 
on a certain kind of question: what lawyers should do when their 
professional duties require them to take or condone actions they would 
otherwise consider immoral.27  The essays coming out of the Working 
Group were published in 1984 in an influential edited volume called 
The Good Lawyer. 28   The basic premise of this volume was to 
examine, not the nature of lawyers’ ethical lapses, but whether “the 
professional ideal is itself morally worthy.”29  As philosopher Charles 
Fried had put it in an early article, the question was whether “a good 
lawyer [can] be a good person.”30
 
The philosophers who explored the question of whether a good 
lawyer could be a good person framed the issue in terms of conflicts 
between a lawyer’s professional “role morality” and the obligations of 
“ordinary morality.” 31   As defined by moral philosophers, a “role 
morality” is a set of norms that apply to us in the various social roles 
we occupy in life—parent, soldier, lawyer—which are narrower than 
the norms of ordinary morality that apply to all of us as persons.32  
 
25 Preface, THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 22, at vii.  The Working Group included 
philosophers Richard Wasserstrom, Gerald Postema and Bernard Williams, who had 
already contributed to moral theory in legal ethics.  See Wasserstrom, Lawyers as 
Professionals, supra note x; Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 21; Bernard 
Williams, Politics and Moral Character, in WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK: 
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980 54, 63-66 (1981).  It included legal ethicists 
Charles Wolfram and Murray Schwartz.  It also included Robert Kutak, who was at 
that time chairing the ABA commission drafting the Model Rules of Professional 
Responsibility.  See Preface, supra, at viii. 
26 Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse, supra note 18, at 452. 
27 Id. at 456, 462. The other, less prominent, questions involved the provision of 
legal services to indigents.  Id. at 471-73. 
28 THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 22.  
29 David Luban, Introduction, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 22, at 1, 1. 
30 Fried, supra note 22, at 1060. 
31 Luban, Introduction, supra note 29, at 1. 
32 See Richard Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 
22, at 25; DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 104-27 
(1988).  But see Bernard Williams, Professional Morality and Its Dispositions, in 
THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 22, at 259, 259-62 (arguing that it is more helpful 
and less misleading to consider such conflicts in terms of the dispositions that 
professionals acquire as a result of their education and training). 
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What makes the situation of role morality complicated from a 
philosophical point of view is that even while we are occupying a 
social role, we are still persons subject to ordinary moral obligations.33  
The important and interesting question for moral philosophers of that 
time was how to resolve conflicts between what it is right for us to do 
in our professional roles and what is morally right for us to do as 
persons.34
 
Because moral philosophers sought to frame the important and 
interesting questions in legal ethics in terms of conflicts between role 
morality and ordinary morality, their first order of business was to 
define lawyers’ role morality in terms that would create such conflicts.  
The task of articulating a morally problematic “role morality” for 
lawyers was accomplished through articulating and critiquing what has 
come to be known as the “standard conception” of the lawyer’s role, 
defined by principles of partisanship and neutrality.35  As defined in 
the early legal ethical writings, the principle of partisanship requires 
lawyers to maximize their clients’ objectives “within, but all the way 
up to the limits of the law.”36  The principle of neutrality relieves 
lawyers of moral responsibility for the harmful effects on others of 
actions taken in pursuit of their clients’ objectives. 37   Under the 
standard conception, a lawyer’s professional behavior is constrained 
by only two parameters: the client’s objectives and the limits of the 
law.38  Notably, the standard conception does not include independent 
moral responsibility for furthering the public good or for regarding the 
rights or interests of individuals who might be harmed by the legal 
representation.39  Under the standard conception, such considerations 
are not within the lawyer’s job description.  The responsibility of 
ensuring that justice emerges from the clash of competing partisan 
views of the law and facts in a case is placed on the “broader 
institutional shoulders” of the adversary system itself. 40 The 
 
33 LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 105-16. 
34 Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, supra note 32, at 25-29. 
35 Different authors have called the principles by different names and defined the 
principles slightly differently.  LUBAN, supra note 32, at 7.  For different 
formulations, see Postema, supra note 22, at 73; Schwartz, Professionalism and 
Accountability, supra note 22, at 673; Simon, Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 22, 
at 36. 
36 Postema, supra note 22, at 73. 
37 Id. at 73; Schwartz, supra note 22, at  673; Simon, Ideology of Advocacy, supra 
note 22, at 36. 
38 Postema, supra note 22, at 74. 
39 WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 8 
(1998). 
40 Postema, supra note 22, at 64. 
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combination of partisan loyalty and moral neutrality was posited as the 
root of the problems of legal professionalism. 
 
To create tension between role morality and ordinary morality, 
moral theorists gave the “limits of the law” and “client objective” 
parameters a particular and extreme interpretation. The “limits of the 
law” parameter was interpreted broadly to embrace any colorable 
interpretation that the law can arguably sustain—a style of 
interpretation David Luban called “zeal at the margin.”41  Lawyers 
who advocate zealously at the margin of the law do not engage in good 
faith interpretation of the law, but treat legal limits instrumentally, 
looking for ways around or loopholes through them.42  Accordingly, 
they push the “limits of the law” that are meant to constrain the pursuit 
of their clients’ interests “well past whatever moral and political 
insight constitutes the ‘spirit’ of the law in question.”43  Defined in 
these terms, the “limits of the law” are not really limits at all; they are 
challenges to the cleverness and gamesmanship of lawyers.44  Because 
“zeal at the margin” was defined as pushing law beyond moral limits, 
the pursuit of “zeal at the margin” was virtually guaranteed to generate 
conflicts between role morality and ordinary morality. 
 
But lawyers cannot get out to the margin of the law and 
morality on their own.  The standard conception defines a lawyer’s 
partisan duties as the loyal pursuit of a client’s objectives.45  A lawyer 
is unlikely to experience conflicts between ordinary and role morality 
when representing altruistic clients whose objectives include doing the 
right thing and treating others fairly.  Even clients who are motivated 
primarily by self-interest but still care about containing litigation costs, 
preserving long-standing business relationships with present 
adversaries, or maintaining their reputations in the community will 
have an interest in avoiding the far reaches of “zeal at the margin.” 46  
To push lawyers out to the margin where the philosophically 
interesting conflicts arise, legal ethicists had to construct clients whose 
objectives were defined solely in terms of maximizing their legal 
interests—their wealth, freedom, or power over others—in disregard 
 
41 DAVID LUBAN, The Adversary System Excuse, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN 
DIGNITY, 19, 26 (2007) (“zealous advocacy always means zeal at the margin”). 
42 Id. at 25-26; LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 16-17. 
43 Luban, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 41, at 26. 
44 LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 17. 
45 Postema, supra note 22, at 73; MODEL R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.2(a) (2002) (a lawyer 
is to abide by a client’s decision regarding the objectives of representation). 
46 See Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11, 26-
27 (1991). 
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of the consequences to others and in disregard of their own long-term 
relationship and reputational interests. 
 
It is only by equating “zeal at the margin” with what it means 
to be a “good lawyer” that the critiques raised by early legal ethicists 
become critiques of legal professionalism, rather than critiques of bad 
lawyering.  If a good person could be a good lawyer most of the time, 
the conflicts between role morality and ordinary morality would 
materialize in only exceptional cases.  And a critique of the 
exceptional case does not serve the theoretical purpose of 
demonstrating how the professional ideal itself—the “role morality” of 
lawyers—is morally corrupt. 
 
B. Critiques of the Standard Conception 
 
Moral theorists mounted essentially two critiques of the 
standard conception, one of which focused on the viability of public 
policy justifications for lawyers’ partisan dedication to their clients’ 
interests, and the other of which focused on whether lawyers who 
practiced according to the standard conception could themselves be 
good persons.  However, these critiques depended for their force and 
vitality on a vision of lawyers who push the law as far as it could go 
out of loyalty to cardboard clients bent on wrongdoing and unable to 
be persuaded off that course. 
 
1. The Adversary System Excuse Critique 
 
Early moral theoretical writings questioned the adequacy of 
traditional appeals to the adversary system to justify lawyers’ 
representation of morally reprehensible clients or the use of morally 
questionable tactics. 47   Adversarial partisan ethics are traditionally 
justified by arguing that zealous pursuit of a client’s interests 
ultimately serves public goals even if it produces what seems like 
injustice in the situation at hand. 48    This traditional view of the 
adversary system, into which members of the legal profession are 
socialized, has been defended by utilitarian arguments that adversarial 
testing leads to more accurate truth-finding; procedural justice 
arguments about the power of adversarial proceedings in effectuating 
the legitimacy of law; and the consonance of partisan representation 
 
47 Wasserstrom, supra note 21, at 12. 
48 The most prominent early example is FREEDMAN, supra note 17. 
BEYOND CARDBOARD CLIENTS 
 
 11
                                                
with liberal democratic values of individual autonomy, dignity and 
fairness.49
 
Moral theorists responded that the standard conception—and 
its endorsement of instrumental manipulation of the law to maximize a 
client’s legal interests—may accurately capture a lawyer’s moral 
duties in some kinds of legal practice, most notably criminal defense.50  
However, they argued, lawyers wrongly invoke arguments based on 
the adversary system even outside the contexts in which partisan zeal 
is justified, such as non-litigation settings 51  and civil litigation 
between private parties. 52   In the best-known and most sustained 
theoretical critique of the lawyer’s partisan role, David Luban 
systematically critiqued arguments that the adversary system was the 
best way to determine truth, the best way to protect legal rights, or the 
best way to reflect society’s commitment to enhancing personal 
autonomy and protecting human dignity.53
 
Rather than relying on blanket appeals to the “adversary 
system excuse” to justify their behavior, Luban argued that lawyers 
should take into account the moral justifications for their adversarial 
role and weigh the strength of those justifications against the moral 
harm that adhering to the role would cause. 54   Where a lawyer 
represents an individual squaring off against the state or a powerful 
 
49  See generally, MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING 
LAWYERS’ ETHICS 13-43 (3d ed. 2004) (cataloguing systemic arguments in favor of 
adversarial ethics); Pepper, supra note 22. 
50 Moral theorists have generally excused criminal defense lawyers from ordinary 
moral obligations, noting the different public policies at stake in criminal defense.  
See, e.g. David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 
(1993); Murray L. Schwartz, Making the True Look False and the False Look True, 
41 SW. L.J. 1135 (1988).  But see William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal 
Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993). 
51 Schwartz, supra note 22 (arguing that justifications based on the adversary system 
do not hold in non-litigation contexts, such as negotiating and counseling, in which 
the corrective backstop of an impartial arbiter in missing). 
52 Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra 
note 22, at 150 (lawyers in civil cases should be held morally accountable for the 
objectives of the clients they choose to represent and whether the tactics they employ 
assist or undermine the ascertainment of truth). 
53 The critique was initially laid out in Luban’s own contribution to THE GOOD 
LAWYER, entitled The Adversary System Excuse, which has been reprinted in a recent 
volume of essays, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 41.  This essay 
was refined and expanded to cover five chapters of his book, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE.  
LUBAN, supra note 32.  William Simon has developed a similar critique of traditional 
justifications for adversary ethics.  See SIMON, supra note 39. 
54 This weighing involves a four-step process, which is explained in detail in LUBAN, 
supra note 32, at 128-47. 
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institution—exemplified by the paradigm of criminal defense—Luban 
argued that the moral justifications for the adversary system are strong 
and typically require “the kind of partisan zeal characterized in the 
standard conception.”55  In representing clients with greater or roughly 
equal power to their opponents, however, the adversary system is only 
weakly justified by a pragmatic argument that it “seems to do as good 
a job as any at finding truth and protecting legal rights,” and because 
it’s the system we already have.56  Because the adversary system is so 
weakly justified in such cases, he concluded, it “doesn’t excuse much 
more than the most minor deviations from common morality.”57
 
Though theoretically valid, Luban’s critique of the “adversary 
system excuse” depended for its force on images of lawyers who 
manipulate the law, the facts, and the rules that govern their own 
behavior.  For example, in critiquing the consequentialist argument 
that the adversary system is the best way to ascertain truth, he conjured 
the image of the zealous advocate who starts with the story that best 
serves client’s legal interests, “reasons backwards to what the facts 
must be, dignifies this fantasy by labeling it her ‘theory of the case,’ 
and then cobbles together whatever evidence can be used to support 
this ‘theory.’”58  The problem with this kind of advocacy, he argued, is 
that it starts from the “standpoint of the client’s interests” rather than 
from the client’s actual perspective.59  Setting up one manipulative and 
misleading version of the facts against another equally manipulative 
and misleading version of the facts was more likely to result in 
obfuscation and confusion than the determination of truth.60
 
Luban’s argument against the claim that the adversary system 
is the best way to protect legal rights proceeded along a similar course.  
He conceded that individuals in society may need adversarial counsel 
to vindicate legitimate legal rights.  However, he argued—invoking 
both “zeal at the margin” and cardboard clients—this does not support 
“[t]he no-holds-barred zealous advocate [who] tries to get everything 
 
55 Id. at 148.  
56 Id. at 92. Luban suggests, lawyers in civil cases would be enjoined from deceitful 
practices and from inflicting “morally unjustifiable damage on other people.”   Id. at 
157.  They may not take exception from the general moral obligation of obedience to 
the law by manipulating the law “to achieve outcomes that negate its generality or 
violate its spirit.” Id.  And, they may not pursue legally permissible but 
“substantively unjust results.”  Id. 
57 Id. at 149. 
58 Id. at 73. 
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 68-74. 
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the law can give (if that is the client’s wish).”61  When lawyers use 
“tricks of the trade” like delay tactics or driving up costs to gain a 
settlement, they are infringing their opponents’ rights, not vindicating 
their clients’ rights.62
 
Luban’s critiques of zealous partisanship also invoke the image 
of cardboard clients to discredit the notion that promoting individual 
autonomy and human dignity has intrinsic moral worth.  The moral 
worth of pursuing autonomy or protecting dignity, he argued, derives 
from the goodness of the clients a lawyer represents.  Appeals to 
autonomy cannot justify lawyers in helping individuals use their 
freedom under the law to cause unjustifiable harm and violate the 
autonomy of others.63  Likewise, honoring a client’s human dignity by 
providing her with an advocate to tell her story is good only insofar as 
the lawyer tells the client’s story in good faith.64  Lawyers who use the 
law to help clients bully others, manipulate legal processes or 
deliberately distort the facts cannot rely on appeals to autonomy and 
dignity to justify the adversary system’s “peculiar requirement of one-
sided zeal at the margin of the legal and the moral.”65
 
2. The Role Disposition Critique 
 
While the “adversary system excuse” critique focused on the 
adequacy of public policy justifications for adversarial zeal, the second 
kind of critique was concerned primarily with what Daniel Markovitz 
has called “legal ethics from the lawyer’s point of view.”66  From the 
lawyer’s point of view, the issue is not how to justify role-
differentiated behavior to the rest of society, but how lawyers 
personally cope with the moral wrongs their profession requires them 
to commit.67  What is at stake is the lawyer’s personal integrity, or 
ability to live according to values that he has chosen and can endorse 
as part of a coherent life-plan.68
 
The role disposition theorists’ critique draws on a tradition 
pioneered by philosopher Bernard Williams, which focuses on the way 
 
61 Id. at 75. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 83.  See also Luban, Lysistratian Prerogative, supra note 22. 
64 LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE supra note 32, at 86-87. 
65 Id. at 84. 
66 Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethics from the Lawyer’s Point of View, 15 YALE J. L. & 
HUM.  209 (2003). 
67 Markovits,  supra note x, at 220. 
68 Id. at 223. 
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moral agents experience moral obligation. 69   As a philosopher, 
Williams is known for his colorful examples illustrating the internal 
experience of morality: a lorry driver who accidentally runs over a 
young child; 70  and the plight of Jim, a man forced by a military 
dictator to personally execute an innocent villager to prevent the 
dictator from executing twenty innocents.71  Williams’s philosophical 
work builds on the strongly intuitive notion that our moral concerns in 
these situations cannot be fully expiated by telling us that the moral 
harm we cause—injuring a child by accident or executing an innocent 
person under coercion—is not really our fault.72  A theory that delivers 
the answer that causing such harm “isn’t morally wrong” is incomplete 
because it fails to capture the moral experience of acting—or being 
forced to act—contrary to one’s own values. 
 
Legal ethicists have used Williams’s examples of the lorry 
driver and Jim and the Villagers as analogies for the situation of 
lawyers whose professional role obligations require them to act 
contrary to ordinary moral obligations. 73   The problem with the 
standard conception, they argue, is that it defines a “good lawyer” as a 
lawyer who can carry out partisan duties without experiencing 
personal moral qualms, and it thus encourages lawyers to embrace 
moral detachment in their professional work. 74   Following in 
 
69 See B. A. O. Williams, Ethical Consistency, in PRACTICAL REASONING 91 (Joseph 
Raz, ed. 1978) (discussing the nature of conflicts between one’s own competing 
moral judgments); Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, in WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK, 
supra note 25, at 20 (discussing the phenomenon of “agent-regret” we feel upon 
causing harm accidentally); Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J.J.C. 
SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973) 
(describing the failure of utilitarianism to capture the moral experience of being 
required to commit a moral wrong in order to optimize moral outcomes). 
70 Williams, Moral Luck, supra note 69, at 28. 
71 Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, supra note 69.   
72 For example Williams argues that the lorry driver should feel a special kind of 
“agent-regret” that is different from the regret felt by a spectator who witnessed the 
accident. Williams, Moral Luck, supra note 69, at 28. Likewise, although Jim would 
be morally justified in accepting the dictator’s invitation—and Jim might even be 
morally self-indulgent if he refused it—killing an innocent villager by his own hand 
still alienates Jim from himself and from projects close to the center of his moral 
personality in a way that observing someone else commit the deed would not. 
73 See, e.g. Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 22, at 68-69 (discussing the 
lorry driver example); Markovits, supra note 66, at 221-41 (extended analysis of 
Williams’ example of Jim and the Villagers as applied to lawyers).  Williams himself 
suggested that the creation of a professional class of amoral lawyers was perhaps a 
necessary evil that society tolerates because lawyers need to get their hands dirty if 
they are to get their jobs done.  See Bernard Williams, Politics and Moral Character, 
in WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK, supra note 25, at 54, 63-66; Bernard Williams, 
Professional Morality and Its Dispositions, supra note 32, at 266. 
74 Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 22, at 78. 
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Williams’ tradition, they argue that moral detachment is ultimately an 
ineffective strategy for coping with the deviations from ordinary 
morality that lawyers’ professional role requires, because it creates a 
disposition toward amorality that aggravates the level of harm that 
lawyers are willing to visit on others and is ultimately unsatisfying to 
lawyers themselves.75
 
While Luban was clear in both defining “zeal at the margin” 
and directing his critique of adversary ethics against it, role disposition 
theorists did little to spell out the conditions that pose threats to 
lawyers’ personal integrity.  They relied instead on vague assertions 
that legal representation requires lawyers to engage in unspecified 
“knavery,” 76  or to regularly commit acts that most people would 
consider “lying, cheating and abusing.”77 Or, they claimed, a lawyer’s 
personal integrity is put at issue by the very fact of legal 
representation, because legal representation necessarily requires 
lawyers to disingenuously present legal and factual claims they do not 
personally believe.78
 
However, as critics have noted, the sweeping characterization 
of legal representation as “lying, cheating and abusing” can be made 
only by stripping lawyers’ acts from the contexts in which they are 
performed. 79   Understood within the rules and expectations that 
govern the practice of law, many of the tactics that moral theorists 
target would not ordinarily be considered lying or cheating.80  And, 
some of the more abusive tactics cited by legal ethicists—such as 
asking invasive and embarrassing questions at a deposition—arguably 
cannot be understood outside the context of legal representation at 
all.81  Moreover, in Williams’s examples, it is the extremity of the 
 
75 Postema, Self-Image, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 22, at 306 (arguing that 
professional detachment leads to a life characterized by “confusion, contradiction 
and self-deception”); Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 22, at 68-69 
(arguing that morally detached lawyers come to view the harm they cause as if they 
were spectators rather than participants). 
76 See id. at 63; Postema, Self-Image, supra note 75, at 288.  Postema himself 
expressed doubt about the claim that “knavery” is a regular aspect of legal 
representation, adopting the characterization for purposes of argument, but noting his 
own view that the claim is “exaggerated and too often romanticized.”  Id. at 288. 
77 Markovits, supra note 66, at 217-19.   
78 Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 22, at 77; Markovits,  supra note 66, at 
218.  
79 Ted Schneyer, The Promise and Problematics of Legal Ethics from the Lawyer’s 
Point of View, 16 YALE J. L. & HUMANITIES 45, 61-63 (2004).   
80 Id. at 62-63.   
81 W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1, 29 (1999) (“it is almost impossible to think of a relevantly similar 
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moral harm that creates the threat to the agent’s personal identity. 82  A 
lawyer who found her client’s version of the facts plausible would be 
hard-pressed to claim that her personal integrity was placed in 
jeopardy by fact of legal representation itself. 
 
The role disposition theorists’ claim that adherence to 
professional role necessarily threatens lawyers’ personal integrity 
begins to make sense only if we imagine that lawyers routinely 
represent clients with goals that transgress ordinary moral bounds.83  
Like the critique of the “adversary system excuse,” the role disposition 
theorists’ critique is based on an implicit reliance on cardboard clients 
who push their lawyers up to and past the limits of the law. 
 
C. Moral Lawyers as the Solution to the Problems of Legal 
Professionalism 
 
Although the critiques of traditional partisanship proceeded 
along two tracks—a critique of the “adversary system excuse” and an 
analysis of the effect of legal representation on lawyers’ moral 
characters—they converged on a common solution: lawyers should 
reject the moral neutrality inherent in the standard conception and 
draw on their independent moral judgment to reign in their partisan 
advocacy.  The purpose of importing ordinary moral considerations 
into legal representation was to supplement the parameters defining 
professional behavior under the standard conception—client objectives 
and the limits of the law—with additional constraints based on the 
assessments of right and wrong that lawyers would make outside their 
professional roles. 
 
Luban’s alternative ideal of professionalism—which he called 
moral activism—imposed on lawyers the moral responsibility to 
“break role” in compelling moral circumstances to respond to the 
 
case that would arise in everyday moral life, where an agent was duty-bound to ask 
embarrassing questions of complete strangers, while the strangers were absolutely 
required to answer them”).  Williams’s own view was that it was difficult to talk 
about divergences between ordinary morality and role morality by focusing on 
lawyers’ actions because “the same act can be acceptable in some contexts and not in 
others.”  Williams, Professional Morality, supra note 73, at 260-61. 
82  Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 22, at 75 (“as the moral distance 
between private and professional moralities increases, the temptation to adopt one or 
the other extreme strategy of identification also increases: one either increasingly 
identifies with the role or seeks resolutely to detach oneself from it”); Williams, 
Professional Morality, supra note 73, at 263-64.   
83 See Markovits, supra note 66, at 262-63 (arguing that it is the routine and habitual 
nature of lawyers’ wrongdoing, rather than its severity, that erodes a lawyer’s moral 
character). 
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human pathos of those on whom harm would be visited as a result of 
adhering to professional role obligations.84  To address the deleterious 
effects of the standard conception on lawyers’ moral characters, 
Gerald Postema made the similar suggestion that lawyers should 
replace the standard conception’s strategies of moral detachment with 
the exercise of lawyers’ “engaged moral judgment.”85  Rather than 
viewing their role as fixed by the standard conception of neutral 
partisanship, he advocated that lawyers cultivate “mature, responsible 
moral judgment in the[ir] professional activities,” 86  drawing on a 
broad range of “ordinary moral beliefs, attitudes, feelings, and 
relationships.”87
 
While the prospect of lawyers exercising responsible moral 
judgment sounds unobjectionable—even appealing—moral theorists 
imported it into their alternative ideals of professionalism along with 
problematic assumptions about lawyers and clients.  As we have seen, 
to create the kind of dilemmas they wanted to discuss, moral theorists 
assumed that clients were basically self-interested and uncaring toward 
others.  In formulating their solution, they made the opposite 
assumption about lawyers, whom they posited as primarily motivated 
to lead moral lives and pursue the public interest.  The alternative ideal 
of professionalism that emerged from these assumptions of moral 
lawyers and cardboard clients positioned lawyers as the moral and 
social conscience of legal representation—providing a necessary check 
on the self-seeking behavior of their clients. 
 
 When he first introduced his solution to the critique of the 
“adversary system excuse,” David Luban was skeptical that holding 
lawyers morally accountable would have much of an impact on the 
profession.  “Lawyers get paid for their services, not for their 
consciences,” he wrote, “and criticizing an ideology won’t change the 
world.”88  In later writings, he increasingly came to identify moral 
activism with an alternative ideal historically situated within legal 
professionalism. 89   He connected moral activism with a “noblesse 
oblige” tradition rooted in the functionalist sociology of Talcott 
 
84 Luban calls this the “morality of acknowledgment.”  LUBAN, supra note 32, at 127.  
See also David Luban, Freedom and Constraint in Legal Ethics: Some Mid-Course 
Corrections to Lawyers and Justice, 49 MD. L. REV. 424, 451-52 (1990) (clarifying 
that the duty to “break role” in compelling moral circumstances captured the truest 
essence of his alternative ideal of moral activism). 
85 Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 22, at 83 (emphasis in the original). 
86 Id.; Postema, Self-Image, supra note 75, at 289. 
87 Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 22, at 70.  
88 LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 41, at 63-64. 
89 LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 160. 
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Parsons and the Progressive politics of Louis Brandeis, which viewed 
lawyers as public servants mediating between clients’ self-interest and 
the public good.90
 
The vision of “gentleman lawyers” or “lawyer-statesmen” who 
act as buffers between self-interested clients and the public good has 
gained currency in legal ethics in the decades following Luban’s 
articulation of the moral activist ideal.91  Some legal ethicists trace the 
roots of this vision to a republican notion of lawyers as a “virtuous 
elite” whose professional autonomy and freedom from market forces 
position them well to secure the goods that would allow society to 
flourish. 92   Others posit that lawyers’ professional training and 
experience endow them with superior capacities of deliberation and 
practical judgment that specially equip them for the role of wise 
counselors.93  The very notion of professionalism has been understood 
by some as an attempt to recapture in neutral and egalitarian terms a 
“gentleman’s ethic” more characteristic of a bygone age in which 
lawyers were recognized as “America’s aristocracy.”94
 
However, as critics are quick to point out, the image of the 
“gentleman lawyer” has profoundly inegalitarian roots in elitist 
practices that historically excluded women, Blacks, Jews, and Eastern 
European immigrants from the profession of law.  The biggest 
challenge for those who hearken back to the lawyer-statesman ideal is 
whether it is possible to recast the vision of the lawyer-statesman in 
egalitarian terms, or whether elitism is an inherent part of the vision.95
 
When you play out the picture of moral activist lawyers who 
“take it upon themselves to judge and shape client projects” to fit the 
 
90 Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 
717, 739 (1988) (the lawyer is “a buffer who mediates between illegitimate client 
desires and the social interest”).  For a similar view, see William H. Simon, Babbitt 
v. Brandeis: The Decline of the Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 565 (1985). 
91  ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION (1993); Robert L. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B. U. L. 
REV. 1, 11-19 (1988); Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of 
the Legal Ethics Code, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 250-56 (1992). 
92 Pearce, supra note 91, at 250-56; Gordon, supra note 91, at 14-16. 
93 KRONMAN, supra note 91. 
94 THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR 
COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 49 (1991).  See also Pearce, supra 
note 91, at 396-97; Gordon, supra note 91, at 16-19. 
95 W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social Norms 
in Professional Communities, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1955, 2025-28 (2001); SHAFFER & 
SHAFFER, supra note 94, at 48-49. 
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common good, 96  the problems begin to become apparent.  For 
example, lawyers following Luban’s “moral activist” model of client 
counseling, will employ increasingly intrusive techniques that begin 
with appealing to clients’ consciences and inventing alternative ways 
for clients to satisfy their interests.  If those tactics do not dissuade the 
client, moral activist lawyers may go on to mislead clients by 
emphasizing or exaggerating the probability of negative consequences 
of an immoral course of action or threatening to withdraw, which 
would cost the client money and perhaps even legal representation.  If 
all else fails, the lawyer will betray the client by acting in accordance 
with the lawyer’s own values, even over the client’s objection.97
 
In a particularly heavy-handed description of moral activist 
representation, Luban describes the “lawyer for the damned” who  
“takes on cases that no one else will come near, cases in which the 
client has for one reason or another rightly become odious or 
untouchable in the eyes of mankind.”98  In accepting representation of 
such odious clients, the lawyer “attempt[s] not merely to save the 
client from the consequences of her deeds but to transform and redeem 
her.”99  Luban followed his discussion of lawyers “transforming and 
redeeming” their clients by extolling a 1905 speech in which Louis 
Brandeis commended the superior practical wisdom of lawyers, which 
Brandeis suggested endowed lawyers with “a position materially 
different from that of other men . . . the position of the adviser of 
men.”100
 
The combination of evangelism and elitism in these references 
paints a rather frightening picture of the lawyer-client relationship, and 
to his credit Luban has explicitly disclaimed its most disturbing 
aspects. Lawyers, he has suggested, are not “more virtuous, decent 
courageous or compassionate than the rest of us,” but have “the same 
moral insight as anyone else.”101  And, he has insisted, the heart of 
moral activist client counseling is best described as “discussing with 
the client the rightness and wrongness of her projects and the possible 
impact of those projects on ‘the people’ in the same matter-of-fact and 
(one hopes) unmoralistic manner that one discusses the financial 
aspects of a representation.”102
 
96 Luban, Noblesse Oblige Tradition, supra note 90, at 737-38.   
97 Id.; LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 173-74. 
98  Id. at 162. 
99 Id. at 162 (emphasis added). 
100 Id. at 171, quoting Louis D. Brandeis, Opportunity in the Law. 
101 LUBAN, supra note x, at 171. 
102  David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client 
Relationship, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1026 (1990), quoting LUBAN, LAWYERS AND 
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However, the descriptions of the goals and methods of moral 
activism continue to veer in the direction of moral elitism.103  The 
problem is that to defend the lawyer-statesman ideal, one has to 
explain why lawyers are better situated than their clients to exercise 
responsible moral judgment in legal representation.  And, moral 
theorists in legal ethics face a high hurdle in that regard.  The demands 
of “ordinary morality” are inherently egalitarian; they do not depend 
on social status, professional training or expertise.  Ordinary morality 
applies to us because we are persons, and lawyers and clients are on an 
equal moral footing as persons.  Unless one can provide an explanation 
of why lawyers are better situated than clients to exercise moral 
judgment, the chances of advancing the public good by pursuing the 
client’s moral choices would seem to be just as great as the chances of 
advancing the public good by shaping client projects according to the 
lawyer’s moral choices.104
 
Moreover, if one posits a morally pluralistic society, in which 
there are different and divergent reasonable conceptions of what 
morality requires, the idea of lawyers policing the morality of their 
clients’ projects becomes especially problematic. 105   The lawyer-
statesman ideal requires lawyers to assess both the public good and 
their clients’ deviance from the public good.  However, judgments 
about the public good depend on the application of moral standards 
 
JUSTICE, supra, note 32, at 174.  He clarified that the references to lawyers 
“transforming and redeeming” their clients were meant for the special case of the 
“odious or untouchable” client, and did not represent the heart of his view of client 
counseling.  Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy, supra, at 1025.  And, he 
cautioned that lawyers should remain open to the “possibility that it is the lawyer 
rather than the client who will eventually modify her moral stance.”  LUBAN, 
LAWYERS AND CLIENTS, supra note 32, at 173.  
103 Luban has emphasized that the “element of truth” in Brandeis’ speech was that 
lawyers are better situated than their clients to consider the common good.  Luban, 
Noblesse Oblige Tradition, supra  note 90, at 725.  And, he has more than one time 
suggested that lawyers should see it as their responsibility to “make their clients 
better” and actively “steer their clients in the direction of the public good.”  Id. at 
721; LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 171.  
104 The question of whether lawyers are better situated to make moral decisions in 
legal representation is taken up in Part III.E. 
105 The problems that moral pluralism poses for legal ethical theories are a subject of 
increasing attention within legal ethics.  See Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role 
Morality for Lawyers, 51 MD. L. REV. 853 (1992); Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers, 
Justice and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. L. REV. 389 (2005); 
Thomas D. Morgan & Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representation in a Pluralist Society, 
63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984 (1995); Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting 
Professional Identity, 74 COLO. L. REV. 1 76-90 (2003); W. Bradley Wendel, Public 
Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1999). 
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about which persons in a morally pluralistic society may reasonably 
disagree.106  If lawyers impose limits on the pursuit of their clients’ 
legal interests—limits that spring from their own understanding of 
morality—they abandon their public role as channels through which 
clients can access the law.107
 
The early moral theorists in legal ethics did not have to 
confront the challenges that moral pluralism presents to their ideal of 
the lawyer-statesman nor to explain why it was more appropriate for 
lawyers to take moral responsibility for the decisions made in legal 
representation than to leave that responsibility with clients.  By staying 
within the assumptions of moral lawyers and cardboard clients, legal 
ethicists were able to posit clients as self-interested and morally 
suspect and lawyers as repositories of public values. 
 
 Because the early moral theorists critiqued an extreme and 
narrow vision of partisanship, they concluded that the parameters that 
define lawyers’ professional duties under the standard conception—
client objectives and the limits of the law—were too weak to constrain 
lawyers from harming third parties and eroding the public interest. 
Legal ethicists did not question whether legal practice according to the 
standard conception served clients well; they assumed that it did.108  
They did not consider alternative ideals of partisanship that would 
encourage lawyers to be more sensitive to clients’ concerns, because in 
their view lawyers were already overly solicitous of clients.  They 
focused their attention on whether unmitigated partisanship served the 
public well and whether it allowed lawyers to lead morally defensible 
lives.  Having concluded that it failed on both scores, they sought 
solutions that would bolster lawyers’ duties to the public at the 
expense of their loyalty to their clients. 
 
 
106 For a more extended version of this argument, see Kruse, Lawyers, Clients and 
the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. L. REV.  (2005). 
107 Stephen L. Pepper, A Rejoinder to Professors Kaufman and Luban, 1986 AMER. 
B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 657, 666.  See also W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (2004). 
108 Postema is an exception.  In his early essay, he argued that moral detachment 
adversely affected the lawyer-client relationship by disengaging lawyers’ abilities to 
relate to their clients as persons and to recognize the clients’ own moral 
personalities.  Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 22, at 80.  However, the 
solution he proposed left the moral direction of legal representation in the hands of 
lawyers with no guidance as to the meaning or goals of morally engaged 
partisanship. In a follow-up essay, the concern for clients was absent from discussion 
and Postema focused on the effects of amoral lawyering on the personal integrity of 
lawyers. Postema, Self-Image, supra note 75. 
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The focus on moral lawyers and cardboard clients prevented 
the early ethicists from exploring the possibility that the real problems 
of legal professionalism might originate—not primarily from selfish 
clients who push their lawyers to the limits of the law—but primarily 
from lawyers who focus too narrowly on their clients’ legal interests 
and fail to view their clients as whole persons with a myriad of non-
legal concerns.  The next part explores how theoretical legal ethics 
might have unfolded if moral theorists had pursued the idea that the 
central moral problem of legal professionalism is not the conflict that 
lawyers face between role morality and ordinary morality, but the 
problem of legal objectification. 
 
II. THE  ROAD NOT TAKEN: LEGAL OBJECTIFICATION AS THE 
CENTRAL PROBLEM OF LEGAL PROFESSIONALISM 
 
A serious analysis of problem of legal objectification is a road 
not taken in legal ethics.  But it is a road that could have been taken.  
This part traces its potential, noting that the earliest essay outlining the 
moral issues in legal professionalism identified the problem of legal 
objectification and called for a solution of limited 
deprofessionalization that would decrease the professional distance 
between lawyers and clients.  A concurrent movement in the legal 
interviewing and counseling literature advocated a client-centered 
approach to legal representation that re-oriented the lawyer-client 
relationship in ways responsive to the problem of legal objectification.  
Had these threads come together, they could have redefined the 
problems with legal professionalism and suggested a different kind of 
solution. 
 
A. Wasserstrom’s Lost Concern for Legal Objectification 
 
In 1975, Richard Wasserstrom’s published a groundbreaking 
essay that raised “two moral criticisms of lawyers,” each of which 
“concern the lawyer-client relationship.”109  The first criticism was the 
familiar concern that in carrying out their professional role obligations, 
lawyers are required to further the interests of morally unworthy 
clients and to disregard the moral harm that partisan advocacy visits on 
others. 110   As we have seen in Part I, this criticism of legal 
professionalism came to dominate the discourse as legal ethicists 
framed the moral issues in legal ethics as conflicts between role 
morality and ordinary morality. 
 
 
109 Wasserstrom, supra note 21, at 1. 
110 Id. at 3-4. 
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Wasserstrom’s second moral criticism is less familiar: that the 
lawyer-client relationship is itself morally suspect because lawyers 
tend to objectify their clients in legal terms and to treat them 
paternalistically. 111   “[F]rom the professional’s point of view,” he 
wrote, “the client is seen and responded to more like an object than a 
human being, and more like a child than an adult.”112  The problem of 
lawyer paternalism—treating a client “more like a child than an 
adult”—has received limited attention from legal ethicists. 113   
However, the problem of lawyers’ objectification of their clients—
treating a client “more like an object than a human being”—has gone 
largely unnoticed as a moral problem in its own right.114
 
What is hardly ever discussed—perhaps hardly ever noticed—
is that Wasserstrom viewed his two moral criticisms as aspects of a 
single underlying pathology. 115  It may seem a paradox, Wasserstrom 
noted, that a lawyer could be both excessively preoccupied with a 
client’s concerns and inattentive to the client. 116   However, he 
explained, the lawyer accomplishes both by being “overly concerned 
with the interest of the client and at the same time fail[ing] to view the 
client as a whole person.”117  According to Wasserstrom, lawyers are 
not alone.  All professionals tend to objectify their clients or patients 
by focusing attention on the subject matter of their expertise.  
Professionals in medicine, law and psychiatry tend to view a client or 
patient “not as a whole person but a segment or aspect of a person—an 
interesting kidney problem, a routine marijuana possession case, or 
another adolescent with an identity crisis.” 118   For lawyers, the 
problem of legal objectification arises from viewing clients narrowly 
in terms of their legal interests alone. 
 
The tendency of lawyers as professionals to objectify their 
clients reveals the two kinds of moral disregard—for clients as whole 
persons and for anyone not a client—as different aspects of the same 
 
111 Id. at 1. 
112 Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
113 Luban, Paternalism, supra note 22; William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client 
Autonomy: Mrs. Jones’s Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213 (1991).  But see, David Luban, 
Introduction, THE ETHICS OF LAWYERS xi, xiv (1994) (noting that the issue of 
lawyers’ paternalism toward clients has “attracted a much smaller philosophical 
literature” than the issue of harm caused by overzealous advocacy). 
114 For limited exceptions in early legal ethical literature, see Warren Lehman, The 
Pursuit of a Client’s Interests, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078 (1979); Simon, Ideology of 
Advocacy, supra note 22. 
115 Wasserstrom, supra note 21, at 1, 15. 
116 Id. at 16. 
117 Id. (emphasis added). 
118 Id. at 21. 
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problem.  The root of the problem lies in the narrow definition lawyers 
give to their client’s objectives.  Clients, it might be argued, come to 
lawyers with the capacity and desire to be moral; it is lawyers, with the 
analytical precision of their professional training, who slough off 
clients’ non-legal concerns and focus only on the legally relevant 
aspects of the case.  Consonant with their professional training, 
lawyers “issue-spot” their clients as they would the facts in a blue-
book exam, reducing client objectives to bundles of legal rights and 
interests.  Lawyers then pursue those legal interests in disregard of 
both clients’ actual wishes and the harm caused to others.  In the 
process, lawyers disregard their clients’ inclinations to be cooperative, 
moral and socially responsible and encourage the self-seeking 
behavior that accompanies legal interest maximization. 
 
The solution Wasserstrom proposed to this underlying 
pathology of legal professionalism was a kind of limited 
“deprofessionalization” of the lawyer-client relationship.  He did not 
go very far in elaborating what deprofessionalization might mean, and 
he acknowledged that an adequate solution was difficult to envision 
because there were certain “important and distinctive competencies” 
that clients seek and lawyers possess.  At the very end of his essay, 
Wasserstrom suggested that the key to solving the puzzle of limited 
deprofessionalization would have to “await an explicit effort to alter 
the ways in which lawyers are educated and acculturated to view 
themselves, their clients, and the relationships that ought to exist 
between them.”119
 
B. Redefining the Problem: the Hidden Complicity of 
Lawyers in Shaping Client Objectives 
 
In the view of early legal ethicists, lawyers’ partisan loyalty 
and moral neutrality was the source of the moral and ethical problems 
that plagued legal professionalism.  They defined the central problems 
of professionalism as stemming from lawyers’ unquestioning 
deference to clients.  It was clients who pushed their lawyers to the 
limits of the law where the lawyers were required by professional duty 
to transgress the dictates of ordinary morality. 
 
However, if we view legal objectification as the central 
pathology of the legal profession, then pinning the problems on the 
standard’s combination of partisan loyalty and moral neutrality is a 
misdiagnosis.  If lawyers are responsible for transforming their clients 
from whole persons into bundles of legal interests, then lawyers are 
 
119 Id. 
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complicit in creating the conflicts between personal morality and 
professional role morality that the early ethicists observed.  Lawyers 
are complicit because they are the ones who define the clients’ 
objectives narrowly as legal interest maximization in the first place. 
 
The idea that lawyers shape their clients’ objectives based on a 
particular and professionalized perspective is supported by empirical 
research of the legal profession across a number of legal practice 
fields.120   In one recent study, for example, lawyers and clients in 
medical malpractice cases were surveyed to determine their view of 
plaintiffs’ objectives in malpractice suits.  When asked why plaintiffs 
sue, lawyers on all sides of litigation—representing doctors, hospitals 
and patients—“either immediately or ultimately described the issue as 
one of money—solely or primarily.”121  By contrast, the vast majority 
of medical malpractice plaintiffs did not cite money as their sole or 
even their primary motivation; and, sixty-five percent of plaintiffs 
didn’t mention money until they were prompted.122  What plaintiffs 
said they wanted to gain by suing were admissions of responsibility, 
the prevention of harm to others, answers to their questions, retribution 
for misconduct, and apologies for the suffering caused by medical 
error.123  The study concluded that the discontinuity between lawyer 
and client understandings of clients’ objectives was due in part to the 
fact that “lawyers are trained to operate according to rights and rules, 
applying law to facts and placing people and occurrences into legal 
categories.” 124   As a consequence, lawyers endeavored to fit their 
clients’ more emotional goals “into legally cognizable categories—
ultimately relating to monetary compensation alone.”125
 
The problem of legal objectification was discussed in a pair of 
other early legal ethics article.  In 1978, as one part of a sweeping 
critique of professional ideology, William Simon argued that lawyers 
who adhere to the dominant ideology of professionalism “impute 
certain basic aims to the client and . . . work to advance these imputed 
 
120 See AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR 
CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS (1995) (divorce); Tamara 
Relis, “It’s Not About the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs’ 
Litigation Aims 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 701 (2007) (medical malpractice); Marvin W. 
Mindes & Alan C. Adcock, Trickster, Hero, Helper: A Report on the Lawyer Image, 
1982 AMER. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 177 (survey of lawyers and public on the 
image of lawyers). 
121 Relis, supra note 120, at 713. 
122 Id. at 721. 
123 Id. at 723. 
124 Id. at 740. 
125 Id. at 741. 
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ends.”126  As Simon noted, the ends are defined on the basis of egoistic 
assumptions that “emphasize extreme selfishness.” 127   Simon 
suggested that lawyers end up representing a “hypothetical person with 
only a few crude discrete ends” who bears little resemblance to the real 
client whose satisfaction relies on a complex balance of interrelated 
goals within the context of cooperative social relationships.128  In an 
essay published a year later, Warren Lehman further developed 
Simon’s point by analyzing how the lawyer’s instrumentalist approach 
to legal advice based on the interests of a “standardized” client can 
distort the decision making of clients, whose deference to their 
lawyers’ expertise may cause them to overvalue factors like the tax 
consequences of important life decisions.129
 
Lawyers’ complicity in shaping their clients’ objectives was 
also revealed—though not explicitly discussed—in Luban’s discussion 
of custody blackmail in divorce cases.  Luban offered custody 
blackmail as an example of “precisely the sort of hardball tactic that 
would be virtually impossible to justify without the standard 
conception.”130  He described it as a practice in which “the divorcing 
father (at the behest of his attorney) threatens to demand joint custody 
unless the mother reduces her financial demands.”131  It is beyond the 
bounds of morality, he argued, for “the zealous divorce lawyer [to] 
suggest[] custody blackmail to a father who has no desire for 
custody.” 132   Such a lawyer “has wronged the wife and children, 
contributed to the social problem of emiserated divorced mothers, 
added to the general sexism of American society and abused the legal 
system.”133
 
For Luban, custody blackmail was an example of the need for 
lawyers to break role and take moral charge of the legal representation 
by refusing to pursue a financial benefit for their clients at the cost of 
moral harm to others.  However, custody blackmail is also precisely 
 
126 Simon, Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 22, at 53. 
127 Id. at 54. 
128 Id. at 55. 
129 Lehman,  supra note 22, at 1088-89.  Lehman relates two personal anecdotes in 
support of his point about tax consequences.  In one, a client defers an intended gift 
until a more tax advantageous time, and ends up dying in a car crash without ever 
bestowing the gift.  Id. at 1088.  In the other, a widow recovering from alcoholism 
avoids going to a lawyer for advice on selling a house that has become an emotional 
and psychological burden to live in, fearful that she will be talked into delaying the 
sale to gain a tax advantage.  Id. at 1089. 
130 Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy, supra note 102, at 1016. 
131 Id. at 1015. 
132 Id. at 1018. 
133 Id. 
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the sort of hardball tactic that it is difficult to imagine a divorcing 
father coming up with on his own.  Luban’s own description of the 
practice reveals the active participation of the divorce lawyer: the 
divorcing father makes the custody demand “at the behest of his 
attorney” who “suggests” it to him.  It is implicit in the very definition 
of the tactic that the lawyer advances a claim for custody that the client 
doesn’t really want to win.  It is lawyers who begin legal 
representation by constructing their clients narrowly in the image of 
the clients’ legal interests who are likely to come up with the tactic of 
custody blackmail in the first place.134
 
C. Re-defining the Solution: the Client-Centered Approach 
to Legal Representation 
 
At about the same time Wasserstrom was making his call for 
“an explicit effort to alter the ways in which lawyers are educated and 
acculturated to view themselves, their clients, and the relationships 
that ought to exist between them,” 135  legal education was in the 
nascent stages of a movement with just those goals.  Also undergoing 
fluorescence in the mid-1970s, the clinical legal education movement 
was in the midst of developing a curriculum for teaching the skills and 
values of lawyering in the context of live client representation. 136   
However well cardboard clients worked to discuss dilemmas in the 
legal ethics classroom, they were ill-fitted to the clinical teaching 
context, in which law students developed relationships with actual 
clients and confronted the complexities of their clients’ life situations 
in their fullest dimensions. 
 
It was within the client interviewing and counseling literature 
designed for clinical teaching that a solution to the problem of legal 
objectification developed.  The most prominent model of lawyering to 
emerge from the clinical legal education movement was the 
development of client-centered representation, an approach to 
 
134 Because the practice of custody blackmail is an ethically marginal tactic, a lawyer 
who was morally disinclined to employ it could easily find support in professional 
standards of conduct.  MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (“In 
representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose 
other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person”). 
135 Wasserstrom, supra note 22, at 23. 
136 The earliest clinical teaching materials focused on the acquisition of professional 
role by breaking down and analyzing the various aspects of legal representation that 
made up what Gary Bellow and Bea Moulton famously called “the lawyering 
process.”  GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS 
FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978).  For a history of this pedagogical 
movement, see Symposium: Celebrating The Lawyering Process, 10 CLIN. L. REV. 1 
(2003). 
BEYOND CARDBOARD CLIENTS 
 
 28
                                                
lawyering that encouraged lawyers to conceptualize legal 
representation as problem-solving, to attend to clients’ non-legal 
needs, and to include them in participatory decision-making on matters 
of legal strategy. 137   Client-centered representation is taught 
pervasively in law school clinical and lawyering skills courses and has 
since generated a rich body of practice and pedagogy-based 
scholarship about lawyering, much of which explores the internal 
dynamics of the lawyer-client relationship.138
 
The client-centered approach is directly responsive to the 
problem of legal objectification.  It urges lawyers to unlearn the 
professional habit of “issue-spotting” their clients and to approach 
their clients as whole persons who are more than the sum of their legal 
interests.  The hallmarks of the client-centered approach include 
understanding the client’s problem from the client’s point of view and 
shaping legal advice around the client’s values.139  Under the client-
centered approach, hearing clients’ stories and understanding their 
values, cares and commitments is the first step—and a continuing 
duty—of legal representation.140
 
The client-centered approach also re-orients the lawyer-client 
relationship along the lines of limited de-professionalization 
foreshadowed by Wasserstrom’s essay.  In a highly professionalized 
conception of role, lawyers exercise maximum professional control 
 
137  DAVID A. BINDER, ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED 
APPROACH 2-15 (1991).  For a comprehensive examination of the history and 
theoretical basis for this approach, see Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered 
Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990).  For a survey 
of the growth and development of the client-centered approach into a multiplicity of 
closely-related lawyering theories, see Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The 
Plural Values of Client-Centered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2006). 
138  For a fuller description of the theories that have grown up in the critique, 
expansion and modification of the client-centered approach, see Kruse, Fortress in 
the Sand, supra note 137, at 375-99. 
139  BINDER, ET AL. supra note 137, at 19-22.  The client-centered approach is 
contrasted with more traditional approaches to lawyering, which “view client 
problems primarily in terms of existing doctrinal categories” and “seek the best 
‘legal’ solutions to problems without fully exploring how those solutions meet 
clients’ nonlegal as well as legal concerns.”  Id. at 17. 
140  For discussion of techniques for helping lawyers hear and understand their 
clients’ stories and perspectives, see Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach “Justice, 
Fairness and Morality,” 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (1997); Jane H. Aiken, Provocateurs 
for Justice, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 287 (2001); Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building 
Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers,  8 CLIN. L. REV. 65 (2001); Kimberly 
O’Leary, Using “Difference Analysis” to Teach Problem-Solving, 4 CLIN. L. REV. 
65 (1997). 
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over strategic decisions with minimal consultation from clients.141  In 
client-centered representation, the focus on understanding clients’ 
objectives more broadly and holistically than the sum of the clients’ 
legal interests tends to break down the boundaries between legal and 
non-legal strategies for addressing clients’ problems.142  By contrast, 
the lawyer-statesman ideal proposed by legal ethicists reinforces a 
highly professionalized view of the lawyer-client relationship.  In 
addition to using professional expertise to shape tactical and strategic 
decisions, lawyers are encouraged to make professional judgments 
about morality and the public good.  Client influence and participation 
in representation decisions is seen as a threat to the independence that 
lawyers need to establish and maintain to play an effective role as 
mediator between clients’ self-interested projects and the public 
interest.143
 
 Although the client-centered approach has been seen as 
appropriate for the contexts in which it is primarily taught—law school 
clinical programs that serve poor and otherwise marginalized clients—
it has been argued to have limited application in the circles of highly-
paid lawyers for high-powered clients.144  As legal ethics has matured 
as an academic discipline, legal ethicists have increasingly gravitated 
toward analyzing the scandals and pressures of practice in the big law 
firm, where the vision of “zeal at the margin” is “alive and well” and 
the conflicts between role morality and ordinary morality can most 
clearly be found. 145   Wasserstrom’s early insight—that the amoral 
attitude lawyers exhibit toward others outside the lawyer-client 
relationship is connected to the way lawyers treat their clients—has 
 
141  DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: WHO’S IN CHARGE? 7-28 
(1974) (contrasting traditional and client-participatory professional relationships).   
142 Kruse, Fortress in the Sand, supra  note 137, at 392-94. 
143 Gordon, supra note 91. 
144  See Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 718-19 (1987) 
(distinguishing contexts in which clients “enjoy economic leverage over their 
lawyers” from those in which lawyers’ social status and expertise gives them power 
over clients).  See also Dinerstein, supra note 137, at 521-23 (discussing whether 
“the historical relationship to poverty law means[s] that client-centered counseling 
should be restricted to representation of poor people”); Kimberly E. O’Leary, When 
Context Matters: How to Choose an Appropriate Client Counseling Model, 4 T.M. 
COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 103 (2001) (distinguishing practice settings in 
which client-centered practice is more or less appropriate).  
145 Douglas N. Frenkel, et al., Introduction: Bringing Legal Realism to the Study of 
Ethics and Professionalism, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 703 (1998) (summarizing 
conclusion of empirical study of large-firm litigators’ ethical attitudes that the 
standard conception was “alive and well”). See also Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal 
and Autonomy, supra note 102, at 1016 (“The true haven of the standard conception, 
however, is large-firm practice”). 
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been lost between the diverging paths of clinical scholarship and legal 
ethics. 
 
III. LEGAL ETHICS FOR THREE-DIMENSIONAL CLIENTS 
 
This Part weaves the insights of client-centered representation 
into legal ethics by proposing and defending a theoretical model of 
client value-based representation that re-defines the standard 
conception’s principles of partisanship and neutrality in the context of 
three-dimensional clients who come to legal representation with a 
mixture of values, commitments, relationships, hopes, dreams and 
fears.  It starts with the premise that client objectives are complex and 
multidimensional and places client values—as the client defines 
them—at the center of a lawyer’s partisan duties.  When the pursuit of 
a client’s objectives is redefined in the context of three-dimensional 
clients, the standard conception’s principles of partisan loyalty and 
moral neutrality look different.  This Part argues that the redefined 
versions of partisan loyalty and moral neutrality survives the critiques 
that legal ethicists leveled at the extreme version of partisanship 
captured by “zeal at the margin” without succumbing to the dangers of 
moral elitism and moral overreaching that the lawyer-statesman model 
presents. 
 
A. Putting Client Values at the Center of Legal 
Representation 
 
In an early article on lawyer paternalism, David Luban 
provided a theoretical vocabulary of wants, values and interests with 
untapped potential for addressing Wasserstrom’s puzzle of limited 
deprofessionalization.146  Wasserstrom noted that the idea of limited 
de-professionalization is difficult because clients come to lawyers for 
help with problems that really do require legal expertise.  Although it 
is problematic to reduce a client to nothing more than a bundle of legal 
interests, legal issue-spotting is a core competency of lawyering and a 
necessary component of virtually all legal representation. 147   The 
puzzle is in figuring out how to “weaken the bad consequences” of 
lawyers’ tendency to professionalize the lawyer-client relationship 
“without destroying the good that lawyers do.”148  
 
Luban’s theoretical vocabulary re-defines client objectives in 
three dimensions, suggesting that client objectives are complex, 
 
146 Luban, Paternalism, supra note 22. 
147 MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.1, Cmt. par. [2]. 
148 Wasserstrom, supra  note 22, at 23. 
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ambiguous and potentially conflicting.  Luban theoretically 
distinguished three different aspects of a client’s objectives, as 
follows: 
• Wants are those things a client subjectively desire in the 
moment; they are like facts that exist but cannot be disputed.149 
• Values are the desires with which a client most closely identify, 
playing an important role in defining a client’s larger life-plans 
and self-conceptions.150 
• Interests are “generalizable means to any ultimate end.” 151   
They include freedom, wealth, health, power, and control over 
other people’s actions. 152   Interests are not valuable in 
themselves, but as means by which we can satisfy our wants 
and actualize our values.153 
 
 According to Luban’s analysis, the touchstone for a lawyer’s 
appropriate intervention into client decision making is whether the 
intervention supports or undermines the client in actualizing her 
values.154  The primacy of client values emerges from the way Luban 
analyzes what a lawyer should do when clients’ wants, interests and 
values conflict.  Luban argued that lawyers are justified in 
paternalistically manipulating clients to promote the clients’ interests 
in favor of the clients’ wants.155  If a client expresses the desire to 
deviate from the maximization of legal interests, Luban saw it as “the 
lawyer’s job to express the conservative and restrained point of view” 
from the standpoint of the client’s interests.156  Because wants come 
and go, a lawyer who protects a client’s interests can serve as a sort of 
“ego” to the client’s “id”—getting clients past the fleeting wants that 
dominate their desires in the moment and keeping their future options 
open. 157   However, lawyers are not justified in paternalistically 
 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 470. 
151 Id. at 471. 
152 Id. at 466, 471. 
153 Id. at 474. 
154 I have previously discussed respect for client values in terms of enhancing a 
client’s autonomy.  Kruse, Fortress in the Sand, supra note 137, at 399-414.  When a 
lawyer overrides a client’s wants in favor the client’s interests, Luban calls it 
“justified paternalism.”  Luban, Paternalism, supra note 22, at 472.  But see Simon, 
Mrs. Jones’ Case, supra note x, at 224 (arguing that refined versions of autonomy 
and paternalism converge in a view that would support a client in actualizing her 
own values). 
155 Luban, Paternalism, supra note 22, at 472-74. 
156 Id. at 493. 
157 Id. at 493.  See also id. at 486 (arguing that the superiority of what he calls the 
Ideal of Prudence “lies in the flexibility of the goods I have termed ‘interests’ in 
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manipulating clients to further the client’s interests in ways that 
override the client values. 158   Because values form the core of a 
client’s personality, manipulating a client to act against the client’s 
values is a violation of the client’s personal integrity. 159   Such 
paternalistic intervention cannot be justified because interests are not 
valuable in themselves—they derive their value from their utility as 
means toward other ends.160
 
To place the actualization of client values at the center of legal 
representation would require lawyers to assist their clients in making 
decisions that are consistent with the clients’ most important goals and 
life plans.  As Luban and other philosophers have discussed, values are 
those things that are closest to the centers of our personalities, and 
which invest our lives with meaning.161  Values play a dual role, both 
motivating our actions and shaping the way we define ourselves.  Our 
values are in one sense normative—they provide reasons for our 
actions.162  But our values are also expressions of our identity—they 
define who we are.  And the motivation that values provide for our 
actions is connected to the way they define who we are.  We are 
motivated to live our lives in accordance with our values because it is 
through acting in accordance with our values that we become the 
persons we want to be.163
 
Living a life in accordance with our values is likely to be a 
process that unfolds over time through experiences of conflict and 
confrontation.  In part, this is because of the diversity of values that 
can form the cores of our identities. 164   We may value a life of 
adventure or the life of the mind.  We may value material success, 
family ties, or quality time spent with friends.  Our values may be 
based in career choices, political commitments, projects that we have 
 
realizing our ambitions, not in the intrinsic merits of money or power . . . in other 
words, in its breadth and not in its depth.”)   
158 Luban, Paternalism, supra note 22, at 472-74. 
159 Id. at 473.  
160 Id. at (“[i]t is absurd . . . to assume that interests constitute the dominant values in 
a human life”). 
161 Id. at 470; Bernard Williams, Persons, Character and Morality, in MORAL LUCK, 
supra note x, at 1, 12-13 (describing “ground projects” through which we define our 
lives’ success). 
162 CHRISTINE KORSGAARD, THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 8 (1996) (normative 
statements “make claims on us; they command, oblige, recommend or guide). 
163 For a discussion of this idea in the context of autonomy theory, see Kruse, 
Fortress in the Sand, supra note 137, at 404-05. 
164 See Thomas Nagel, The Fragmentation of Value, in  MORTAL QUESTIONS 128 
(1979) (discussing values coming from different types of sources: personal 
obligations, rights, utility, perfectionist ends, and private commitments). 
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undertaken—anything by which we define ourselves.  We may feel a 
“calling” to live out our values through commitments to particular 
ways of life—joining the Peace Corps, converting to a religion, even 
going to law school—and those commitments may be the source of 
commitment to political, religious or professional values.  We may 
value ourselves through relationships and in community with others, 
and the ways in which these relationships and communities define us 
may be at the deepest core of our identities. 165   Because of this 
diversity, our values are likely to be internally inconsistent, forcing us 
to choose between them as we move through life.  Practical choices—
what career path to pursue, for example—will often bring our values 
into internal conflict, forcing us to prioritize and choose between them.  
It is through practical choices made in situations of value conflict that 
we are likely to discover, articulate and actualize the kind of persons 
we want to be. 
 
Yet, the process of assessing and clarifying our values in 
situations of value conflict may be difficult.  Our deepest values are 
often opaque; we may be motivated by underlying values that we don’t 
explicitly recognize, but which can be seen over time to tie our choices 
together in recognizable patterns.166  Moreover, our process of value 
clarification may be distorted by short-term and reactionary emotions 
like anger, fear and insecurity. 167   Or, we may succumb to 
rationalizations that sound like the articulation of our values, but 
which are really just excuses for doing what we want to do it the 
moment.  Value clarification is a process of self-reflection—often 
triggered by experiences of confrontation and choice—that helps 
penetrate the fog of confusion that may attend practical choices in the 
face of uncertainty.  Its purpose is to help us surface and order our 
values so that our lives will reflect our values, and we can become the 
kind of persons we want to be.168  
 
When clients come to lawyers for legal advice and 
representation, their legal issues are often entangled with values, 
projects, commitments, and relationships with others.  Sometimes 
 
165 SHAFFER & SHAFFER, supra note x, at 98-108.  
166 Luban, Paternalism, supra note 22, at 470.  In later work, Luban has suggested 
that many times we do not experience the things we care the most about as being 
chosen by us, but rather we feel as if our values have chosen us.  DAVID LUBAN, 
Lawyers As Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren’t Busy Assaulting It), in 
LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 41, at 65, 76. 
167 Luban, Paternalism, supra note 22, at 473. 
168 Christina Korsgaard sees the process of “reflective endorsement” as central to our 
ability to act autonomously—to give authoritative law to ourselves.  See 
KORSGAARD, SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY, supra note 162, at 129. 
BEYOND CARDBOARD CLIENTS 
 
 34
                                                
legal tasks may touch on a client’s deeply held personal values, such 
as getting legal help to start up a business a client has always dreamed 
of having or helping a couple adopt a child.  Sometimes legal action 
arises because a client has been harmed by the actions of others: the 
client has been fired from a job, hit by a car, or beaten by a spouse.  
Sometimes the client has been accused of treating others unjustly: 
sexually harassing an employee, reneging on a deal, negligently 
allowing harm to others, or committing a crime.  Other times clients 
come to lawyers to overcome barriers to taking care of business as 
usual: a deal needs to be negotiated, property needs to be leased, or a 
permit needs to be obtained. 
 
In discussions with clients, lawyers will inevitably emphasize 
and order information in ways that influence the client’s choices.169  
Whether or not a lawyer discusses a client’s other commitments, 
projects, relationships and values, the client still experiences the legal 
interests within the context of these other considerations.  The 
counseling approach the lawyer employs will put a thumb on the scale 
in favor of particular considerations.  If the lawyer believes that her 
role is to maximize the client’s legal interests, the lawyer will take an 
approach that emphasizes legal interests over other considerations.  By 
contrast, lawyers who believe that their role is to shape representation 
around a client’s values will give their clients space to clarify those 
values and make representation decisions that are consistent with those 
values. 
 
As Luban pointed out, lawyers’ tendency to focus on their 
clients’ legal interests may be justified to the extent that it diverts 
clients from making impulsive decisions.  If a client is experiencing 
loss, transition or uncertainty about the future—such as in a divorce or 
in the aftermath of a serious life-changing injury—the protection of 
legal interests may be the most effective way to keep the client’s future 
options open until she is able to adjust to dramatic changes in her life 
and sort her values out.  Where the threatened loss will severely impair 
the client’s ability to pursue options in the future—as in criminal cases 
where defendants face substantial loss of liberty or even death—there 
may be particularly strong imperatives to protect the client’s legal 
interests to keep avenues open for the client’s future ability to 
actualize her values. 
 
 
169 See Simon, Mrs. Jones’s Case, supra note 113 (describing how lawyers influence 
their clients’ decision making even when they are ostensibly providing clients with 
information about legal interests). 
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However, legal interest-based counseling serves the 
actualization of the client’s life goals only indirectly.  Legal interests 
are not good in themselves; they are merely the channels by which 
clients can use the law to pursue and protect the things they value in 
life.  Protecting a client’s legal interests helps the client only because 
interests are generalized means toward anyone’s ends.  The temporary 
restraint on impulsive decision making that legal interests provide is 
valuable precisely because pursuing the wants of the moment may 
foreclose the client from actualizing more deeply-held values, goals, or 
life plans. 
 
Counseling that proceeds on the assumption that client’s 
merely want to maximize their legal interests is far from neutral.  In 
the context of legal representation—where the client may be 
confronting new opportunities or battling fear, uncertainty, anger or 
pain—counseling clients that they “should” do what is in their legal 
interests to do may distort the client’s process of value clarification 
and encourage self-seeking choices.170  Lawyers who say “this is what 
you should do”—when what they really mean is “this is what it is in 
your legal interests to do”—may encourage clients to press their legal 
interests further than the clients might otherwise be inclined to pursue 
them.  Clients who might otherwise be motivated to act in the public 
interest may be dissuaded by their deference to a lawyer’s professional 
expertise.  Or, if a client is experiencing hurt or anger, knowing how 
the law can be used to defeat the interests of others may provide the 
client with a way to rationalize selfish choices at the expense of the 
client’s better moral judgment.  Just as lawyers may seek refuge in the 
excuse, “but that is not my job”; clients may seek refuge in the excuse, 
“but I’m just following legal advice.”171
 
When a lawyer approaches legal representation as problem-
solving endeavor shaped around the client’s values, it helps to mitigate 
the distorting influence of legal interests and allow the client’s values 
to provide a natural check on legal interest maximization.  Like legal 
interests, appeals to client values—to the kind of person that a client 
wants to be—help curb impulsive, fearful or vengeful decisions.  
However, rather than achieving this goal by appealing to a 
hypothetical client’s standardized interests, client value clarification 
appeals directly to the client’s own values.  The purpose of value 
clarification in legal counseling is not to change the weight or priority 
of the client’s values—though that might be a byproduct of the 
 
170 Lehman, supra note 22, at 188-89. 
171 See Pepper, Lawyers’ Ethics in the Gap Between Law and Justice, 40 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 181, 189-90 (1999). 
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process.  The purpose is to ensure that the client’s representation 
decisions are consistent with and further the client’s values. 
 
The methods of client value clarification involve both actively 
listening to what the client wants and probing beneath the client’s 
expressed desires.  Client-centered interviewing literature, for 
example, suggests that the lawyer dedicate time early in a client’s 
initial interview for open-ended questions and other active listening 
techniques that help the lawyer hear the client’s problem in the client’s 
own terms.172  Hearing the client’s story—as the client chooses to tell 
it—is a key component of understanding what the client values and 
what it is about the legal representation that will threaten or further 
those values. 
 
Client value clarification may also require probing beneath the 
surface of a client’s stated desires.  As Lehman has suggested, when 
clients seek legal representation, their judgment and articulation of 
what they really want may be skewed: “We say we want justice when 
we want love.  We say we were treated illegally when we were hurt.  
We insist on our rights when we have been snubbed or cut.  We want 
money when we feel impotent.” 173   Lehman noted that instead of 
inquiring about clients’ deeper goals, most lawyers give 
instrumentalist advice on how to maximize outcomes based on a the 
desires of a hypothetical “’standard client’ for whom lawyers are wont 
to model their services.”174  By contrast, lawyers interested in helping 
a client center decisions on the client’s own values will help their 
clients contemplate how the decisions of the moment will affect the 
clients’ development in the direction of becoming the kind of person 
each of them uniquely wants to be. 
 
B. Partisan Loyalty for Three-Dimensional Clients 
 
The centering of legal representation on client values suggests 
a more defensible ideal of partisanship than the “zeal at the margin” 
for cardboard clients that has occupied legal ethical critique.  As we 
have seen, the moral theorists’ critiques of the standard conception 
drew their force from their extreme interpretation of partisan loyalty as 
“zeal at the margin” for clients who want nothing other than to 
maximize their legal interests up to and beyond the moral limits in the 
law.  When this conception of partisanship is replaced with an ideal 
 
172 BINDER, ET AL., supra note 137, at 88-93. 
173 Lehman, supra note 22, at 1081. 
174 Id. at 1089. 
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based on helping clients actualize their own values, the critiques lose 
much of their force. 
 
Hidden within the adversary system critique is a defense of 
partisanship conceived more broadly as shaping legal representation 
around a client’s actual values and fashioning advocacy around the 
stories that clients would tell about themselves.  For example, Luban’s 
argument against the truth-finding efficacy of adversarial proceedings 
was based on the observation that lawyers use a client’s legal interests 
as a starting point from which to develop facts and present evidence to 
a decision maker.  The “theories of the case” that arise from this 
method are misleading because they are based, not on the client’s 
actual perspective of what occurred, but on what it would be best—
from the standpoint of the client’s legal interests—to prove.175  Under 
client-value centered partisanship, advocacy would be focused on 
finding ways connect clients’ own stories to themes and values 
reflected in the law.176  Luban conceded that developing facts from the 
actual perspectives of disputing clients (rather than from the standpoint 
of their competing interests) would support, rather than hinder, 
accurate truth-finding. 177   The same goes for the arguments from 
human dignity and legal rights. The adversary system, Luban 
conceded, could be defended quite strongly on grounds of human 
dignity,178 precisely because providing the opportunity for a client to 
tell her own story is an important way of honoring her dignity. 
 
In his later work, Luban has sketched just such an ideal of 
partisan advocacy based on upholding a client’s dignity in which 
lawyers strive to match the case theory the lawyer presents—the legal 
story the lawyer tells about a client in negotiation or litigation—with 
the cares, commitments, and concerns that are most central to the 
client.179  According to Luban, human dignity means “having a story 
 
175 For a criticism of advocacy that proceeds from this perspective in disregard of a 
client’s actual story, see Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing 
Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994). 
176 See, e.g. id; Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 
HASTINGS L.J. 971 (1992); Lucie White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, 
and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
177 See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 73 (“the more perspectives 
we have, the better informed our judgment will be”). 
178 Id. at 85-87. 
179 LUBAN, Human Dignity, supra note 166, at 68-73 (endorsing an even stronger 
argument in favor of partisan advocacy based on the honoring the story that the 
client has to tell).  Luban finds particularly persuasive the account of adversary 
ethics offered by philosopher Alan Donagan as part of the Working Group on Legal 
Ethics. Id. at 819. See Alan Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary 
System, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 22, at 123. 
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of one’s own”—having a subjective view of the world in which one is 
at the center.180  Lawyers dignify their clients by giving voice to their 
clients: by “telling the client’s story and interpreting the law from the 
client’s viewpoint”;181 and “by giving the client voice and sparing the 
client the humiliation of being silenced and ignored.”182   A lawyer 
calibrating legal representation to a client’s values would be much less 
likely to cynically manipulate the facts or stretch the law to extract 
anything it could be made to give, and much more likely to look for 
ways to legitimate the client’s values by connecting them to values 
reflected in the law. 
 
Client value-centered partisanship would also survive the role 
disposition theorists’ critique.  This critique, we can recall, is that the 
standard conception encourages lawyers to develop a professional 
disposition toward amorality, which dulls them to the harm they cause 
others and is ultimately unsatisfying to lawyers themselves.  However, 
client value-centered partisanship would encourage the development 
of a very different disposition: a disposition based in the capacities for 
empathy and self-reflection. 183   To seriously undertake the task of 
centering representation on client values, lawyers would endeavor to 
see the world as their clients see it.  Unlike the disposition of amoral 
detachment, which is argued to be at the root of lawyer alienation and 
discontent, 184  empathy with clients has been noted as a source of 
internal motivation that can help sustain lawyers in their professional 
roles.185
 
In short, in the very places where “zeal at the margin” fails to 
stand up to the deeper scrutiny of the early legal ethicists’ critiques, 
client value-centered partisanship survives.  The critiques of the moral 
theorists are quite forceful when leveled against the extreme vision of 
partisanship captured by “zeal at the margin.”  Yet, if ideal 
partisanship is conceived as being centered on client value 
actualization, a more defensible—even honorable—version of partisan 
loyalty emerges. 
 
180  LUBAN, Human Dignity, supra note 166, at 70-71. 
181  Id. at 70. 
182  Id. at 72. 
183 Markovits,  supra note 66, at 273.  The development of empathic understanding 
has long been a central component of the client-centered approach to interviewing 
and counseling.  See BINDER, ET AL., supra note 137, at 40-42.  Self-reflection has 
also been noted as a key component to successful communication between lawyers 
and clients.  Bryant, supra note 140. 
184 See generally Postema, Self-Image, supra note 75. 
185 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain 
Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239 (1993). 
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C. Moral Neutrality for Three-Dimensional Clients 
  
In addition to critiquing partisan loyalty, the early legal 
ethicists were critical of the moral neutrality of the lawyer-client 
relationship.  However, the critiques of moral neutrality—like the 
critiques of partisan loyalty—were distorted by the assumption of 
morally corrupt cardboard clients who cared only about maximizing 
their wealth, freedom or power over others.  Because the early legal 
ethicists developed their ideal in a context defined by assumptions of 
moral lawyers and cardboard clients, they had in mind clients who 
were by definition devoid of moral constraint.  And, the lawyers they 
had in mind were by definition more suited to moral decision making 
than the cardboard clients they had constructed.  Focusing on client 
value actualization requires a type of moral neutrality on the part of the 
lawyer; because the lawyer focuses on the client’s values, the lawyer 
must put her own values to the side.  However, the moral neutrality of 
client value-centered representation is not morally empty.  Rather, it 
imports moral considerations into legal representation by drawing on 
the rich landscape of the client’s values—including the client’s moral 
values—that might otherwise be excised by the lawyer’s focus on legal 
interests. 
 
Not all outcomes of value clarification favor morality.  
Whether moral claims win out in the process of value clarification 
depends on how important moral values are to the person doing the 
clarifying.  The process of value clarification will assist moral decision 
making for persons who have internalized the moral values about the 
way they ought to treat others.  It may also assist persons who draw 
support for moral behavior from personal values such as being an 
upstanding citizen or good neighbor; in standing by their 
commitments, honoring their word; or maintaining their reputation in a 
community.  But, helping to clarify the values of a person with largely 
selfish values is likely to assist him in endorsing his own self-
regarding behavior.  The emotional core of Luban’s moral activism is 
that standing by neutrally and allowing such a client to act on his 
selfish choices would be tantamount to condoning his mistreatment of 
others.  Intervening to override the selfish choices of such a client 
might violate his autonomy and dignity, but it may at the same time be 
the only way to protect the autonomy and dignity of those who stand 
in harm’s way. 
 
The moral activist approach is defensible in the narrow 
circumstances toward which it was originally directed: the situation of 
BEYOND CARDBOARD CLIENTS 
 
 40
                                                
a moral lawyer counseling a cardboard client.  However, the moral 
activist solution is ill-suited to the representation of three-dimensional 
clients because the tactics of moral activism run directly contrary to 
the principles of respect for a client’s values.  The moral activist 
lawyer’s focus is on conforming the client’s behavior to the lawyer’s 
conception of the public good.  To achieve this end, moral activist 
lawyers employ increasingly aggressive tactics of persuasion, 
coercion, and even betrayal, which deliberately distort the client’s 
decision making process.186  The further along the scale the lawyer 
goes, the more likely it is that the lawyer is battling the client’s deeply-
held values.  Less deeply-grounded resistance is likely to give way 
earlier in the process. 
 
When lawyers and clients disagree about the morality of a 
course of action, the problems with moral activist counseling take on 
an added dimension.  Like most people confronted with someone 
reluctant to act in accordance with what we see as the claims of 
morality, lawyers will have a tendency to believe that their clients are 
mistaken in their moral calculus.  We can affirm on an intellectual 
level that our moral beliefs may reasonably differ from the moral 
beliefs of others.  However, when we are confronted with someone 
who does not share our moral values, it is difficult for us to understand 
their view as reasonable.  We are more likely to believe that we are 
right and that the other person has made a “moral mistake.”187  The 
belief that their clients are making a moral mistake will naturally tempt 
lawyers to intervene into their clients’ decision making—perhaps even 
by strong tactics—to prevent what they view as a moral wrong.  The 
stakes for the lawyer of gaining a client’s compliance with the claims 
of morality—as the lawyer sees them—are especially high.  Lawyers 
do not simply sit by and tolerate their clients’ differing moral 
viewpoints; they act on them.  The force of the role disposition 
theorists’ critique of the standard conception is that being forced to act 
against their own values is damaging to lawyers. 
 
186 As Luban describes it, moral activist client counseling  
may mean kindling the clients’ consciences, but more often it 
will mean inventing alternative ways for client to satisfy their 
interests.  Sometimes it means persuading clients that the 
course of action they propose will harm them even when that 
is not necessarily so.  In other instances, client counseling will 
require threatening to withdraw from a representation or 
refusing to follow a client’s instructions. In the extreme cases, 
it means telling the client that if he does not back away from a 
course of action, the lawyer will blow the whistle on him. 
Luban, Noblesse Oblige Tradition, supra note 90, at 737-38. 
187 Kruse, Moral Pluralism, supra note 105, at 402-07. 
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The kind of moral neutrality that results from respect for 
another person’s values helps to discipline lawyers’ tendency to 
impose their own moral and value choices on their clients in the guise 
of legal advice.  If we assume three-dimensional clients, it is respect 
for client values that ensures the good that moral activism hopes to 
achieve by importing moral considerations into legal representation 
without succumbing to the danger of moral overreaching. 
 
D. Beyond Moral Lawyers: Three-Dimensional Lawyers in 
the Arena of Legal Representation 
 
If we take seriously the possibility that lawyers shape their 
clients’ objectives in the direction of legal interest maximization, it 
raises a puzzling question for moral theorists: why would lawyers 
willingly create situations that provide them with deep role 
dissatisfaction?  Ethicists concluded that lawyers were forced into the 
deeply dissatisfying kind of practice characterized by “zeal at the 
margin” by their partisan loyalty to clients who insisted that the 
lawyers pursue slash and burn tactics in the pursuit of immoral ends.  
However, if we accept the premise that lawyers construct their clients’ 
objectives as legal interest maximization, we have to conclude that 
lawyers who practice “zeal at the margin” are at least partially 
responsible for their own misery.  Part of the answer has to be that—
just as clients are not solely motivated by the maximization of their 
legal interests—lawyers are not purely motivated by morality and a 
commitment to the public interest.  Lawyers, like clients, are morally 
complex three-dimensional persons who bring a mix of reputational 
interests, personal relationships, values, cares and commitments into 
the arena of legal representation.  And, all of these factors may affect 
lawyers’ decision making for better or for worse. 
 
An examination of the moral complexity of lawyers is 
important for another reason as well.  Even if we reject the moral 
elitist premise that underlies the lawyer-statesman model—that 
lawyers are morally superior to their clients—we might accept the 
more plausible assumption that lawyers are generally better situated 
than clients to make moral decisions in the specific arena of legal 
representation.  As we have seen, in the arena of legal representation, 
clients’ own resolution of their conflicting wants, values and interests 
may be distorted by temporary conditions of anger, fear or insecurity.  
Because they are less personally and emotionally invested in the 
situations that lead to legal representation, lawyers are arguably better 
situated in legal representation to bring moral considerations to bear.  
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However, to conclude that lawyers are better situated as moral 
decision makers in the arena of legal representation, we need to 
consider the ways in which lawyers’ own wants, interests and values 
compete with their moral and professional judgment. 
 
First, and most obviously, the lawyer-client relationship 
involves a commercial exchange of services for fees, giving rise to an 
interest on the part of the lawyer in maximizing the financial return on 
a case.  However the lawyer gets paid—by the billable hour, 
contingent on the outcome, or on a flat fee or contract—the lawyer 
will have a financial interest in the how the representation proceeds.  
Hourly fees give the lawyer an interest in spending a lot of time on a 
case, especially if the client is a “deep pocket” with virtually unlimited 
resources to sink into legal representation.  Consequently, a lawyer 
billing by the hour may have a financial interest in making an 
extravagant investment of time or resources in a task that produces 
only marginally better results for the client.  Contingent fees give 
lawyers an interest in maximizing outcomes with as little investment 
of time as possible, and at any cost to others along the way.  Flat fees 
or contracts give lawyers an interest in resolving the representation of 
each client as quickly as possible, providing an incentive to conclude 
or settle the matter whether or not the client has fully understood or 
bought into the terms of the settlement or agreement. 
 
Moreover, lawyers have a legal interest in protecting 
themselves from malpractice lawsuits by advising clients to maximize 
legal interests and leaving a clear paper trail anytime a client declines 
to follow that advice.  Lawyers who fail to pursue a client’s legal 
interests as far as it is possible to pursue them risk exposure to 
malpractice claims if the client suffers financial damage as a result of 
the decision.  Even if a client has made an informed and reasonable 
decision not to pursue a possible avenue of relief, the lawyer may be 
concerned about liability in the event of the client’s future change of 
heart.  The commonly recommended “CYA” letters that lawyers sent 
to clients are designed to protect themselves against future malpractice 
suits anytime a client decides to act against lawyer advice or the 
clients’ own interests.188
 
 Lawyers also have reputational interests at stake in legal 
representation.  Lawyers may depend on their professional reputations 
to make their practices run smoothly, and may be subject to informal 
social sanctions for engaging in behavior that doesn’t serve the values 
 
188 Karen Erger, Cover Me: Documentation is More Than CYA, 98 ILL. B.J. 316 
(2008). 
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or interests of other members of their professional community.189  In 
some cases, this pressure to conform to informal professional norms 
can support ethical behavior. 190   However, it can also work as a 
collective protectionist strategy to discriminate against lawyers who 
represent outsiders or who are themselves outsiders to the legal 
community.191
 
In addition lawyers, like their clients, have personal values, 
cares and commitments that come into play in legal representation.  
Their personal identities may be defined in part by their ability to win, 
their sense of fair play, or even their ruthlessness or gritty 
determination.  They may have ambitions for career advancement, 
such as the desire to make partner in a firm or to get an appointment as 
a judge.  Preserving relationships inside and outside of professional 
circles may be personally important to them.  They may have political 
commitments to practicing a certain kind of law or achieving a certain 
vision of social justice through their legal careers.  They may value 
their families and the balance that they can achieve between work and 
home life.  They may be members of religious communities or 
political organizations with accompanying values and commitments 
that interact with or affect the actions they take as lawyers.  Any or all 
of these personal values and ambitions may affect lawyers’ decisions 
in legal representation. 
 
As critics have noted, the premise that lawyers are driven to 
overly zealous tactics by the loyal pursuit of client interests does not 
paint a particularly accurate picture of legal practice. 192   When 
examined more closely, it appears that lawyers engage in “zeal at the 
margin”—not because they are loyal to their clients—but because it 
serves their own interests to do so.  Lawyers practicing in small 
communities are likely to curb the zeal of their advocacy to preserve 
their professional relationships and standing in the community. 193   
Lawyers for relatively powerless one-shot clients are more than 
willing to manipulate their clients into taking deals that help maintain 
the lawyer’s professional standing.194
 
189 See generally Wendel, supra note 95. 
190 Id. at 1968-69. 
191 Id. 
192 See Schneyer, Standard Misconception, supra note 22; Stephen Stephen Ellmann, 
Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 116 (1990).  
193 Schneyer, supra note 22, at 156-47; Donald Landon, Clients, Colleagues and 
Communities: The Shaping of Zealous Advocacy in Small Town Practice, 1985 AM. 
B. FOUND. RES. J. 81. 
194  Schneyer, supra note 22, at 1544-45 (discussing Abraham Blumberg, The 
Practice of Law as a Confidence Game, 1 L & SOC’Y REV. 15 (1967)). 
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Even in the place where the ruthless tactics of “zeal at the 
margin” seem to be a more accurate description of lawyers’ 
practices—the large litigation firm—the lawyer’s own drive to 
maximize profits by amassing billable hours provides at least as good 
an explanation as the premise that these lawyers are acting out of 
loyalty to their clients.  At least, the assumption that big firm lawyers 
are driven by their own financial interests may better explain how the 
same lawyers who engage in scorched earth litigation tactics are also 
willing to gouge their own clients with questionable billing 
practices.195
 
In the arena of legal representation, lawyers and clients are thus 
differently situated, but it is difficult to conclude that one is better 
positioned than the other to engage in moral reasoning and decision 
making.  The situations that lead clients to seek legal representation 
may incline clients to pursue their wants in favor of their values.  
Lawyers will generally have no particular investment in the situations 
in which their clients are embroiled.  However, lawyers will inevitably 
have financial, reputational and personal interests that present their 
own form temptation to transgress moral and professional values.  The 
principles of partisan loyalty and moral neutrality—redefined as 
attention to and deference to client value choices—can help check 
lawyers’ own self-interested motivations in legal representation. 
 
E. Spaulding v. Zimmerman in Three Dimensions 
 
We are now in a position to return to Spaulding v. 
Zimmerman—the legal ethics classic in which the lawyer for a 
defendant in a personal injury automobile accident case chose not to 
inform the plaintiff that he suffered a life-threatening heart 
aneurysm—to explore the interests and motivations of the lawyer and 
the client in three dimensions.  As traditionally interpreted, Spaulding 
presents a moral and ethical dilemma for the lawyer: should the lawyer 
breach the professional duty of confidentiality to save a human life?196  
I have suggested that this interpretation of Spaulding has been driven 
by a theoretical interest in creating conflicts between role morality and 
ordinary morality, and that the more interesting ethical question raised 
 
195 Lisa G. Lerman, Gross Profits?: Questions About Lawyer Billing Practices, 22 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 645 (1994); Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Bill 
and Expense Fraud By Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205 (1999); Susan Saab 
Fortney, The Billable Hours Derbey: Epirical Data on the Problems and Pressure 
Points, 33 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 171 (2005). 
196 See, e.g. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND CLIENTS, supra note 32, at 149-50. 
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by the real-life facts of Spaulding is why the lawyer felt entitled to 
settle the case without consulting his client about whether to reveal the 
potentially life-saving information. 
 
I have argued that at the heart of the more interesting question 
in Spaulding is the problem of legal objectification: the lawyer was 
thinking only in terms of Zimmerman’s legal interests.  Certainly, it 
was contrary to Zimmerman’s legal interests to volunteer otherwise 
confidential information that could increase the amount he owed in 
damages.  The defense expert who examined Spaulding opined that the 
heart aneurysm could well have been caused by the automobile 
accident at issue in the litigation.  And, if the doctor was right, it might 
well have affected the amount of money for which David Spaulding 
was willing to settle the case.197  However, this narrow view of what 
was important to John Zimmerman overlooked his relationship with 
David Spaulding and other values that might have influenced 
Zimmerman to reveal the medical information to save the life of his 
neighbor and friend. 
 
Had the lawyer been following a client value-based approach 
to legal representation, the situation would have been different.  First, 
the lawyer would not have received the information about David 
Spaulding’s heart aneurysm in the vacuum of legal interests.  Because 
consistency with Zimmerman’s long-term goals and deeply-held 
values would have been a central concern in the legal representation, 
the lawyer would have spent time at the beginning of the 
representation listening to John Zimmerman about hearing about the 
context in which the lawsuit.  When the information about Spaulding’s 
heart aneurysm came across his desk, the lawyer would have been 
attuned to the importance of the information, not just to the legal case, 
but to Zimmerman’s relationship with the Spauldings family.  And, he 
would have flagged it as an important issue to discuss with his client. 
 
In discussing with John Zimmerman the question of whether to 
reveal the confidential information about David Spaulding’s medical 
condition, the lawyer would explain to Zimmerman that he wasn’t 
legally required to reveal the information and that revealing it might 
drive up the costs of settlement—perhaps even over the limits of the 
insurance policy.  But the lawyer would also be prepared to help 
Zimmerman put his legal interests into the context of his other values 
and commitments.  For example, the lawyer might probe to ensure that 
 
197  When the heart aneurysm was eventually discovered, it required corrective 
surgery that resulted in permanent and severe speech loss for David Spaulding.  
Cramton & Knowles, supra note 6, at 71. 
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whatever decision Zimmerman made about divulging the information 
was consistent with Zimmerman’s long-term values, perhaps asking 
Zimmerman how he would feel looking back on the decision from 
some vantage point in the future. 
 
From what we know about the real Spaulding case, that kind of 
discussion never took place.  And, Spaulding provides a window into 
the personal, financial and reputational interests that may have 
prevented the discussion from occurring.  Zimmerman’s lawyer was 
hired and paid by the insurance company to represent Zimmerman, 
and the insurance contract most likely gave the insurance company 
rights to control the certain aspects of the defense.198  Although these 
contractual rights complicate the decision-making authority in the 
legal representation, they do not alleviate the lawyer’s professional 
responsibility to consult with his client about important representation 
decisions, to share information that might create conflicting interests, 
and to protect Zimmerman’s interests in the event of a conflict of 
interest with the insurance company.199
 
The lawyer’s own interest in future business with the insurance 
company provided a powerful incentive for him to construe 
Zimmerman’s objectives narrowly as legal interest maximization so 
that a conflict would not materialize.  Zimmerman was a one-shot 
client that the lawyer was not likely to encounter again.  The lawyer’s 
long-term financial and reputational interests lay in protecting his 
relationship with the insurance company that hired and paid him.200  If 
Zimmerman had insisted on revealing the confidential information, it 
might have negated the possibility of a settlement within the policy 
limits and created a financial conflict of interest between Zimmerman 
and the insurance company.201  Even if the settlement stayed within 
the policy limits, Zimmerman’s insistence on revealing the 
information might have created a conflict of interest requiring the 
lawyer to withdraw.  It was certainly easier for the lawyer to construe 
John Zimmerman’s objectives narrowly in terms of legal interests 
because when narrowly construed, Zimmerman’s legal interests 
 
198 Id. at 90-91. 
199  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAW. §134 ( 2000); ABA 
FORMAL OP. 01-421 (Feb. 16, 2001).  For contrasting analyses of the difficulties of 
professional obligations in the insurance law context, see Thomas D. Morgan, What 
Insurance Scholars Should Know About Professional Responsibility, 4 CONN. INS. 
L.J. 1 (1997); Kent D. Syverud, What Professional Responsibility Scholars Should 
Know About Insurance Law, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 17 (1997). 
200 Cramton & Knowles, supra note x, at 92-93. 
201 See ABA FORMAL OP. 96-403 (Aug. 2, 1996). 
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remained in alignment with the legal interests of the insurance 
company. 
 
It was also possible that part of the reason for overlooking 
Zimmerman’s broader interests in this case was that the lawyer simply 
viewed the insurance company as the real party in interest and gave 
little thought to John Zimmerman as a client.202  Of course, that does 
not answer the question of why the lawyer did not engage in a serious 
value-based discussion about revealing confidential information with 
representatives of the insurance company.203  It is at least conceivable 
that if consulted, representatives of the insurance company would 
direct the lawyer to reveal the information.  After all, David 
Spaulding’s life hung in the balance, and that is a powerful counter-
weight to the profit motive of even the most calculating profit-
maximizer.204  Even absent the long-term relationship with Spaulding 
that might have motivated Zimmerman to reveal the information, the 
lawyer might have assumed—at least presumptively—that the 
opportunity to save another human life was important to his insurance 
company client as well. 
 
Finally, it is conceivable that even after consultation 
Zimmerman would have directed his lawyer not to reveal the 
information.  He might have decided that he just couldn’t do it to his 
family: the accident had killed his brother and broken his father’s 
neck, the family was struggling to hold things together, and he just 
couldn’t inflict a devastating financial blow to his mother and 
surviving family members.  If so, the lawyer taking a client-value 
based approach might have faced something like the dilemma 
discussed by the early legal ethicists between whether to remain loyal 
to the duties of confidentiality or to follow the moral imperative to 
save a human life. 
 
 
202 Cramton & Knowles, supra at 93. 
203 Id. at 93-94 (concluding that although it is possible that disclosure was discussed 
in the context of settlement offers with the insurance company “it is not clear . . . that 
the issue was the subject of pointed and meaningful consultation” and that “[t]he 
most likely conclusion is that the defense lawyers made this decision largely on their 
own.”) 
204 Id. at 94-95, quoting Stephen Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An 
Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1606 
(1995) (“I wonder why we assume that the middle-level manager in the defendant’s 
insurance company . . . is likely to be more concerned with company profits (or with 
his own career advancement or security) than with the possible death of the 
plaintiff.”) 
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But the lawyer’s dilemma at the conclusion of a client value-
based discussion would not be the same dilemma envisioned by the 
early legal ethicists.  The lawyer’s dilemma would not arise out of the 
lawyer’s solitary struggle over whether to break out of the impersonal 
demands of a professional role.   Rather, the dilemma would arise in 
the context of overriding the decision of a three-dimensional client 
who had struggled through a difficult moral choice.  Betraying another 
person with whom you stand in a relationship of trust and protection is 
qualitatively different than betraying a role obligation.  And this 
difference cannot help but affect the lens through which the lawyer 
views his ordinary moral obligations.  The lawyer who chooses to 
override his client’s considered moral decision says, in essence: “You 
may not be willing to bring more hardship upon your family to save 
David Spaulding’s life, but I am going to do it anyway without your 
permission and against your wishes.”  When the early legal ethicists 
talked about breaking out of bureaucratic professional roles to 
acknowledge the human suffering of third parties, this kind of personal 
betrayal was not what they had in mind. 205
 
Although it is difficult to say with any confidence what 
outcome of a lawyer-client dialogue with either Spaulding or the 
insurance company would have yielded, one thing is certain.  A lawyer 
who felt a professional duty to shape legal representation around the 
client’s values as well as to protect the client’s legal interests would 
not have been prevented by the logic of legal objectification—
buttressed by lawyer self-interest—that pre-empted the lawyer-client 
dialogue in the Spaulding case from occurring. 
 
IV. BEYOND THREE-DIMENSIONAL CLIENTS IN LEGAL ETHICS 
 
In the previous sections, I have argued that the problem of legal 
objectification poses a more central and important moral and ethical 
problem of legal professionalism than the conflicts between role 
morality and professional morality on which legal ethics has 
historically focused.  And, I have argued that a client value-based 
model of legal representation provides an antidote against both the 
self-seeking behavior that legal objectification tends to promote and 
the danger of moral overreaching associated with the lawyer-statesman 
model.  This Part examines representation in three contexts that 
challenge the client value-based ideal of representation I have 
proposed: the representation of clients with diminished capacity, the 
representation of organizational clients, and cause lawyering. 
 
 
205 See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 127. 
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Each of the contexts examined in this Part poses a distinct 
problem in defining and ascertaining client objectives—both generally 
and in terms of client values.  Implementing the methods of client 
value-based legal representation is neither simple nor straightforward 
in any of these contexts.  However, I argue that a client value-based 
approach to representation is still valuable as a professional ideal to 
guide the behavior of lawyers.  Each context provides reasons, 
temptations and opportunities for lawyers to revert to either purely 
legal interest-based representation or representation shaped around the 
lawyer’s own values.  A professional ideal that exhorts lawyers to 
shape representation around client values—even when it is difficult to 
implement directly—provides a valuable check on lawyers’ tendencies 
to either legally objectify their clients or impose their own values on 
the representation. 
 
A. Representing Clients with Diminished Capacity 
 
 When lawyers represent children, the elderly, or other clients 
with diminished capacity, professional rules exhort them to “as far as 
reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with 
the client.”206  However, this is not always easy to do.  Elderly, child 
or developmentally disabled clients often lack the capacity to direct 
their lawyers. 207   The very process of determining how much 
autonomy to allow such clients can result in “circular lawyer-centric 
thinking” in which the lawyer abides by the client’s choices as long as 
the lawyer agrees with them, and uses the client’s disagreement about 
the client’s interests as evidence that the client lacks competency to 
make an informed decision.208
  
  One possibility for a lawyer representing a client with 
diminished capacity is to act as a de facto guardian, shaping 
representation around what the lawyer determines to be in the client’s 
best interests. 209   However, the de facto guardian model has been 
criticized because it provides no constraints to check lawyer 
overreaching based on bias or conflicts of interest.210  The problem is 
that what is “best” for a child, elderly, or other impaired client often 
 
206 MODEL. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.14 (2002). 
207  See generally  Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer 
Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 515 
(1987). 
208 Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed 
Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505, 
1509 (1996). 
209 Tremblay, supra note 207, at 570. 
210 Id. at 575. 
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rests on a value judgment.  Allowing these judgments to be made on 
the basis of the lawyer’s values runs the risk of imposing lawyer 
values on clients whose own values diverge from that of the lawyer.  It 
thus exposes clients to decision-making based on the “the 
personalities, values and opinions of the randomly chosen lawyers” in 
their cases.211
 
Another possibility is for the lawyer to determine an impaired 
client’s objectives by reference to the client’s legal interests.212  Legal 
interests-based representation can help avoid the arbitrariness of “best 
interest” representation by grounding representation decisions in 
objectively determined legal rights.  However, legal interests can also 
be based on conflicting or substantively unfair law.213  Moreover, as 
with fully-functioning adult clients, the reduction of impaired clients to 
their legal interests results in a narrow and individualistic 
understanding of client objectives that overlooks significant non-legal 
reasons why clients might choose not to aggressively pursue their legal 
rights.214  As scholars writing about the role of lawyers for children 
have argued, the narrow focus of legal interests overlooks social 
relationships that child clients may value and can isolate them from 
caregivers and communities in which they form their strongest 
psychological and emotional bonds.215
 
The kind of client value-based approach to legal representation 
proposed in Part III of this Article is difficult to implement directly in 
the case of impaired clients.  The methods of active listening and 
probing to determine whether a decision is consistent with a client’s 
deeply-held values may be difficult or impossible to carry out with 
clients who are impaired in their “ability to understand, deliberate 
upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own 
well-being.”216  For example, elderly clients may not always be lucid, 
or their decisions may reflect distorted priorities. 217   Very young 
children may be unable to express their preferences, and even children 
 
211  Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for 
Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1415 (1996). 
212 Id. at 1412 (arguing that when representing an impaired child client, lawyers 
should be guided by the legal rights the law grants the child). 
213  Annette R. Appell, Decontextualizing the Child Client: The Efficacy of the 
Attorney-Client Model for Very Young Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1955, 1962-
65 (1996) (critiquing Guggenheim’s legal interest representation proposal). 
214 Tremblay, supra note 207, at 551. 
215 Annette R. Appell, Children’s Voice and Justice: Lawyering for Children in the 
Twenty-First Century, 6 NEV. L.J. 692, 699 (2006). 
216 MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.14, cmt., par. [1] (2002). 
217 See, e.g.  Paul R. Tremblay, Counseling Clients Who Weren’t Born Yesterday: 
Age and the Attorney-Client Relationship, 16 FAM. ADVOC. 24 (1993). 
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who can express their opinions often lack the maturity and competence 
to direct their lawyers in complex decision making.218
 
However, when invoked as a professional ideal rather than as a 
methodology, client value-based representation provides a goal toward 
which lawyers can strive.  For example, comments to Model Rule 1.14 
on diminished capacity clients suggest that lawyers can check “the 
consistency of a [client’s] decision with the known long-term 
commitments and values of the client.” 219   With elderly clients, 
lawyers are encouraged to gather information about the client’s long-
term commitments and values by consulting family members who 
have “known and perhaps lived with the client for years.”220  With 
children, the situation is different, because children have “not yet 
reached the point in life when their values have been revealed.”221  
However, lawyers can view client competency as a “dimmer switch” 
that always allows access to some amount of information about the 
client’s unique individuality, and to stay true to the interests and 
wishes of child clients to whatever degree the child’s individuality can 
be expressed.222
 
B. Representing Organizational Clients 
 
Like most of legal ethics, the analysis of legal ethics for three-
dimensional clients is based on a paradigm of individual client 
representation.  The question arises how a lawyering model based on 
individual client representation can translate to situations where the 
client is an organization, rather than a natural person.  More 
particularly, the question arises whether a client-value based model 
makes any sense at all in the context of organizational clients.  After 
all, it is natural persons who have hopes, dreams, fears, loyalties, 
commitments and values that fill out the dimensions of their objectives 
beyond simple legal interest maximization. 
 
The individual client model is used as a metaphor for the 
representation of organizational clients.  Ethically, lawyers for 
organizations are required to treat the organization itself—a fictitious 
entity—as the client.223  This means that the fictitious entity-client is 
supposed to decide the objectives of the representation and engage in 
 
218 Guggenheim, supra note 211, at 1406-07. 
219 MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.14, cmt., par. [6] (2002). 
220 Tremblay, supra note 207, at 569. 
221 Guggenheim, supra  note 211, at 1400. 
222 Id. 
223 MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.13(a) (2002). 
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the consultation required about how those objectives are to be 
pursued.224   However, neither ethical standards nor lawyer training 
provide direction on how a lawyer is to go about ascertaining the 
objectives of a fictitious entity “embodied in a large and diffuse 
collection of people and information.” 225   Lawyers are directed 
generally to defer to the decision-making of duly-authorized 
constituents of the organization—usually officers and directors—on 
matters involving policy, operations, and the assessment of risk.226   
And, most of the ethical heat in organizational client representation is 
generated by situations in which the actions of individual constituents, 
like managers, expose the organization to substantial injury as a result 
of a legal violation. 227   In such situations, lawyers are directed to 
protect the best interests of the organization. 
 
It could be argued that the easiest way for lawyers to separate 
the interests of the organizational client from the self-interest of 
managers and other constituents is to revert to simple legal interest 
analysis.  The objectives of organizations, it might be argued, really 
are nothing more than the sum of their legal and financial interests.  
Hence, the problem of legal objectification that plagues the world of 
individual client representation creates significantly less concern in the 
organizational client context.  In the organizational context, legal 
objectification helps lawyers accomplish what is best for the 
organization—as opposed to individual constituents—by ensuring that 
legal representation decisions protect and promote the organization’s 
best interests. 
 
However, the argument that organizational clients are nothing 
more than the sum of their legal interests is both too facile and 
somewhat suspect.  It is too facile because organizations may well 
have objectives beyond the crude maximization of their freedom, 
wealth and power over others.  Organizations are complex entities 
with reputations, organizational cultures, relationships with outsiders, 
and ties with the community that create interests beyond the 
maximization of their profits.228  The argument is also suspect because 
it too easily conflates the objectives of organizational clients with the 
profit motive of the lawyers who represent them.  Lawyers whose 
 
224 See MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.2(a) (2002)(“ . .. a lawyer shall abide by a 
client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . shall consult 
with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”) 
225 See Donald Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate Securities Lawyering: 
Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 631 (1997). 
226 MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.13, cmt., par. [3] (2002). 
227 MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.13(b) (2002). 
228 JOANNE MARTIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE: MAPPING THE TERRAIN (2002). 
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financial success depends on billable hours have self-interested 
reasons to pursue every conceivable legal argument at their client’s 
expense.229   Lawyers’ legal objectification of organizational clients 
may thus provide a convenient rationalization for the pursuit of the 
lawyer’s own interests under the guise of zealous representation of 
client interests. 
 
On the other hand, it could be argued that the lawyer-statesman 
model is the most promising ideal for guiding lawyers’ professional 
role in the organizational client representation context.  Responsible 
corporate decision-making that takes the organization’s broader 
interests into account requires a range of viewpoints from both insiders 
who are assimilated into corporate culture and outsiders who can 
challenge it.230  Within this mix of views, lawyers can play the role of 
the corporate conscience, questioning whether and how the proposed 
actions of the organization comport with the public interest.231  And, 
the more intrusive methods of moral activist counseling do not present 
the same dangers of moral overreaching when lawyers operate as one 
voice among many in the organizational decision-making process.232  
However, the lawyer-statesman model poses its own problems of 
implementation in the corporate context.  Although strong moral 
counseling seems more appropriate in settings where the client is a 
relatively powerful corporate entity, the lawyer is likely to be less 
comfortable raising moral considerations as part of legal representation 
in such contexts. 233   And, even in the corporate context some of 
 
229 See Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law 
Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 277, 296-97 (1985).  See also Robert Gordon, The Ethical 
World of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 
709, 716-18, 725-26 (1998) (noting a disjuncture between large-firm litigators’ view 
that clients want aggressive no-holds-barred representation and in-house counsels’ 
view that clients want cost-efficiency). 
230 Donald Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and 
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 
(2001). 
231 Stephen Pepper, Lawyers’ Ethics in the Gap Between Law and Justice, 40 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 181, 194-95 (1999); Russell G. Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State: 
Reflections on Public Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1339 (2006). 
232 Pepper, supra note 233, at 194.  See also LUBAN, Human Dignity, supra note 166, 
at 87 (arguing for an abolishment of the lawyer-client privilege for corporations 
because corporations do not have human dignity to violate by self-incriminatory 
disclosure). 
233 Pepper, Ethics in the Gap, supra note 233, at 194-95; Gordon, supra note 230, at 
711; Mark Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in 
Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 843-44 (1998).  See also LUBAN, 
Human Dignity, supra note 166, at 87 (acknowledging that his argument for 
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lawyers’ concerns with explicitly moral dialogue arise from skepticism 
that their “own view of morality” is not universally shared.234
 
The methods of client value-based representation present an 
alternative for lawyers representing organizational clients that lies 
somewhere between the crude assumptions of legal interest 
maximization and the moralistic approach of the lawyer-statesman 
model.  As we have seen in the individual representation context, part 
of the purpose of client value clarification is to curb impulsive client 
decision-making that may be distorted by anger, fear or insecurity and 
to ensure that legal representation furthers the clients’ deeper and more 
fundamental values.235  Lawyers in the corporate context can serve a 
similar function of checking the sometimes unrealistic optimism that 
tends to pervade business and corporate culture by raising measured 
and risk-averse concerns about the long-term consequences of 
proposed decisions.236  And, they can help promote and invite their 
organizational clients’ voluntary compliance with legal regulation by 
being spokespersons with corporate management about the purposes 
and functions of legal regulations.237
 
Such inquiries invite the constituents with decision-making 
authority in an organization to consider the long-term goals and values 
of the organization and to consider how the goals and values of the 
organization fit within the structure of legal regulations that govern 
corporate activity.  And empirical analysis of the attitudes and reported 
behavior of corporate lawyers suggests that they often engage in some 
of the same counseling techniques designed in the individual client 
context to probe the consistency of a client’s decision with the client’s 
 
abolishing the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context—though strong 
philosophically—has been viewed as “too fanciful to take seriously”). 
234 In the words of one large-firm litigator, explaining why he would not engage his 
client in a moral dialogue: 
I personally would have a problem conveying my own view of the morality of the 
situation to a client.  I think morality is a very slippery concept, primarily in the eye 
of the beholder. 
Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a Circle of Blame: Institutional, 
Professional, and Socio-Economic Factors That Contribute to Unreasonable, 
Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 773 
(1998). 
235 See supra Part III.B. 
236 Langevoort, Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering, supra note 226; 
Suchman, supra note 234, at 844 (lawyers tend to assume that unethical behavior 
will carry long-term negative consequences). 
237  Donald C. Langevoort, Someplace Between Philosophy and Economics: 
Legitimacy and Good Corporate Lawyering, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1615 (2006). 
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deeper values.238  For example, researchers in one study concluded 
that when counseling their business clients, lawyers tend to couch 
moral considerations in pragmatic or reputational concerns, such as 
asking a client what a proposed course of action would look like on the 
front page of the newspaper, or how it would be viewed by a judge or 
the jury. 239   Such appeals to reputation are not simply part of a 
pragmatic cost-benefit analysis or strategy for making the lawyer’s 
moral judgment of the client more palatable.  Rather, as Mark 
Suchman points out, “[t]he ‘newspaper test’ operates much like 
Mead’s ‘generalized other’—providing a social looking-glass that 
allows one . . . to see and judge oneself.”240
 
C. Cause Lawyering 
 
Finally, the representation of politically vulnerable, socially 
disadvantaged and otherwise disempowered clients presents both a 
special case of the tension between legal interests-based representation 
and the dangers of moral overreaching associated with the lawyer-
statesman ideal and unique challenges to a client value-based 
representation as a solution. 
 
In one view, the representation of politically and socially 
disempowered client presents the most appropriate venue for a client 
value-based approach to legal representation.  Because of their relative 
lack of legal sophistication, such clients are seen as particularly 
vulnerable to domination by their lawyers. 241   Moreover, the 
construction of client objectives in purely legal terms in the poverty 
law context is especially pernicious because it reinforces inequities 
built into the law itself.  Because those without social advantage lack 
the power to influence the law-making process, the law that affects 
their lives is often created without taking their perspectives into 
account.  A client value-based approach to legal representation holds 
out the promise of making law more responsive to the lived experience 
 
238  The empirical study to which this section refers—called Ethics: Beyond the 
Rules—was sponsored by the American Bar Association Section on Litigation, and 
invited a team of legal scholars, legal ethicists, social scientists to study large firm 
litigators.  Robert E. Nelson, et al., Introduction: Bringing Legal Realism to the 
Study of Ethics and Professionalism, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 701 (1998).  The 
team interviewed both partners and associates at large law firms in two cities over 
extended weekends.  Id.  A year later, they interviewed groups of judges, plaintiffs’ 
counsel, and in-house counsel in the same two cities.  Id. at 702.  The results were 
published in a series of articles in the FORDHAM L. REV.  
239 Gordon, supra note 230, at 733; Suchman, supra note 234, at 844-45. 
240 Id. 
241 See O’Leary, supra note 144; Pepper, Ethics in the Gap, supra note 233, at 194-
95. 
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of clients by shaping legal representation around the values and 
narratives of clients. 242
 
However, the conditions of poverty law practice pressure 
poverty lawyers in the direction of legal interest-based representation.   
The overwhelming need for legal services and the relentless demands 
to meet the immediate and often desperate needs of individual clients 
create pressures to process cases routinely and to settle them as 
quickly as possible. 243   To access the remedies that law offers 
politically vulnerable or socially disadvantaged clients, lawyers must 
slot them into categories that may be disconnected from the 
perspectives and circumstances of their lives.244  And, this pressure 
works against the ability of lawyers to use individual client 
representation to change the contours of the law.  The incentive for 
more powerful repeat players like landlords, employers and banks is to 
settle cases that might make unfavorable law, while the incentives for 
one-shot individual clients are to maximize their tangible gain in the 
particular case by taking the deals they are offered.245
 
Moreover, the typical client value-based methods of 
overcoming legal interest-based representation through active listening 
and probing for client values are arguably insufficient to overcome the 
barriers created by social subordination.  Even when poverty lawyers 
attempt to attend more holistically to the values of fewer individual 
clients—such as in law school clinic settings—the individual focus of 
representation in discrete cases has a tendency to isolate the client’s 
objectives from the collective and community values required for 
reform of unjust laws and systems.246  And, clients who seek legal 
services are often in crisis situations of eviction from housing, denial 
of benefits for life necessities, loss of parental rights, or deportation.  
Attention to the unique needs of such individual clients will often be 
synonymous with getting whatever remedy the law offers to alleviate 
the crisis. 
 
242 Anthony Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning the Lessons of 
Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991); Lucie E. White, Subordination, 
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 
BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
243 See Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions Into problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34 
NLADA BRIEFCASE 106 (1977). 
244 Alfieri, Client Narrative, supra note 243, at 2112-13; White, Sunday Shoes, supra 
note 243, at 27-29. 
245 Mark Galanter, The Duty Not To Deliver Legal Services, 30 MIAMI L. REV. 929, 
938-40 (1976). 
246 Sameer Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 355 
(2008).  See also William H. Simon, Homo-Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal 
Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1980). 
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To escape the endless grind of remedying injustice one client at 
a time, lawyers for politically and socially disadvantaged clients have 
engaged in what Stuart Scheingold and Austin Sarat call “cause 
lawyering.”247  In cause lawyering, the representation of individual 
clients is a means to the achievement of political ends that transcend 
the individual clients’ financial or legal interests.248  Cause lawyers 
choose or recruit clients to fit the needs of the cause and put the needs 
of the cause over the needs of the individual clients who represent the 
class for whom the lawyers advocate. 249   Although the needs of 
individuals are subordinated to collective goals, the promise of cause 
lawyering is to effect reforms that will improve conditions for entire 
classes of persons affected by injustice embedded in the law itself.250
 
Cause lawyers are arguably an embodiment of the lawyer-
statesman ideal.251  The relative independence from client control and 
the ability to define and pursue public interest goals directly are 
consonant with the ideal of the lawyer who mediates between the 
client’s interests and the public good.  As Scheingold and Sarat put it, 
cause lawyers are “advocates not only, or primarily, for their clients 
but for causes and, one might say, for their own beliefs.”252
 
However, the dangers of moral overreaching associated with 
the lawyer-statesman ideal also assert themselves in the context of 
cause lawyering.  Perhaps the quintessential example of cause 
lawyering is the NAACP’s campaign to desegregate public schools.253  
This campaign involved both a carefully-orchestrated legal challenge 
that resulted in the historic 1954 ruling in Brown v. Board of 
Education, 254  and a persistent decades-long effort to enforce and 
 
247  See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: 
POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2006). 
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249 LUBAN, LAWYERS AND CLIENTS, supra note 32, at 317. 
250 Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for 
Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535, 535-37 (1987-88). 
251 See, e.g. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND CLIENTS, supra note 32, at 237-38 (connecting 
the Brandeis vision of the “people’s lawyer” with public interest law practice). See 
also SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note xxx, at 9-17 (exploring the continuities and 
discontinuities of cause lawyering and the lawyer-statesman ideal). 
252 Id. at 9. 
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implement Brown through litigation in lower federal courts. 255    
However, as Derrick Bell argued in one of the earliest critiques of 
Civil Rights lawyering, the lawyers’ pursuit of the goal of 
desegregated schools became disconnected from the goal of better 
quality education that desegregation was designed to achieve. 256   
Committed to the symbolic importance of desegregation, beholden to 
their middle-class donors, and disconnected from the experience of 
inner-city black families, national-level NAACP lawyers opposed 
local efforts by community groups and parents to structure settlements 
that would retain segregated school systems and require the investment 
of resources to improve the quality of inner-city schools.257
 
As in the context of representing clients with diminished 
capacity and representing organizational clients, a client value-based 
model of representation presents itself not so much as a method of 
representing individual clients, but as an professional ideal or “theory 
of practice” around which lawyers representing socially and politically 
disadvantaged clients strive to shape their representation. 258   The 
strategies of a new generation of lawyers practicing law for socially 
and politically disadvantaged clients seek greater participation from 
clients in the formation of collective goals, while at the same time 
recognizing that the clients’ capacity for voicing collective values may 
have to be consciously created, rather than merely received.259  Lucie 
White, for example, recounts ways to create space in the “margins” of 
a lawsuit for class members to discover and define a collective voice 
through speak-out events or street theater. 260   Lawyers have also 
formed alliances with community organizing groups, often playing a 
subordinate role in the definition of the legal services that would 
benefit the larger social movement.261  These strategies seek to avoid 
the disengagement from client values that may result when the 
lawyer—a socially advantaged social and political actor—defines the 
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“public interest” in isolation from the values and perspectives of the 
clients.262
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The debates in theoretical legal ethics center around the way 
lawyers’ roles should be conceived, and they both arise from and help 
define the way lawyers practice law.  The early legal ethicists sought a 
definition of lawyers’ professional “role morality” that would serve the 
theoretical purpose of generating conflicts between role morality and 
ordinary morality.  But in starting from the standpoint of theory, I have 
argued, they misinterpreted practice.  The lawyer behavior that looked 
to them like the overindulgence of client interests, I have argued, was 
really something else.  It was really the lawyers’ own legal 
objectification of their clients: the narrow construction of client 
objectives in terms of legal interests and the disengagement from client 
values.  As a result of misdiagnosing the problems that plagued legal 
professionalism, legal ethicists proposed a solution—the “lawyer-
statesman” model—that aggravates the problem of lawyer 
disengagement from client values by encouraging lawyers to shape 
legal representation around the lawyer’s conception of morality and 
the public interest. 
 
The client value-based approach to representation that this 
Article proposes asserts a faith in client values as a corrective for both 
the anti-social aspects of legal interest maximization and the hubris of 
the lawyer-statesman ideal.  Attention to client values may not, in the 
end, provide salvation from the competitive and self-interested culture 
of American society.  But if competition and self-interest are culturally 
pervasive, reliance on lawyers to transcend by appealing to their own 
personal values is just as idealistic a dream.  The goal of shaping 
representation around the values of clients provides an opportunity for 
legal representation to redeem itself without compromising the core 
values of client loyalty and service that lie at the heart of legal 
professionalism.  Before we give up on the professional values of 
client loyalty and service, we ought to see what it would be like if 
lawyers actually represented their clients, rather than zealously 
pursued their clients’ legal interests. 
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